Chapter 2

The Hero of Sugamo Prison

I

WHEN THE ALLIED POWERS — led by the United States — occupied Japan in 1945, they decided to purge the defeated nation's wartime leaders from public office as part of the sweeping postwar reform they imposed. In addition, the Allies arrested those whom they held responsible for the Pacific War and for committing atrocities.

On 11 September 1945, less than a month after Japan's surrender, arrest warrants were issued for thirty-nine notables, including Tojo Hideki (1884-1948), the wartime prime minister from 1941 to 1944, and the main members of his cabinets and also those who had been in charge of prisoner-of-war (POW) camps. On 19 November there were eleven more arrests, among them was General Araki Sadao (1877-1966), who served in key ministerial posts in successive 1930s cabinets, including minister of education.

The greatest number was arrested on 2 December, when fifty-nine people were detained. Among those taken into custody on that day was Field Marshal Prince Nashinomoto Morimasa (1874-1961), the fourth son of Prince Kuni; another was Hiranuma Kiichiro (1867-1952), a former prime minister and future Class A "war criminal" who was given a life sentence. Also arrested was Hirota Koki (1878-1948), a former foreign minister and a Class A offender, who was hanged in December 1948.

Finally, nine more warrants were issued on 6 December 1945. Among the personalities named on that day were Konoe Fumimaro (1891-1945), a former prime minister, and Kido Koichi (1889-1977), once a minister of the Imperial Household. Many arrests were made [but Japan's three-time premier, Prince Konoe, avoided detention by taking a fatal dose of poison].

An elaborate classification

The Allies devised an elaborate classification system to specify those whom they wished to hold responsible for the war. They grouped war criminal suspects in three categories, A, B, and C. The Class A prisoners were those considered responsible for the planning, preparation, commencement, and waging of "a war of aggression." Class B detainees were those alleged to have committed "war crimes" as violators of international law and conventions. Class C detainees were those held to have engaged in inhuman acts such as killing, enslaving, and persecution of civilians.

In addition, and quite separately from what was going on in Japan, several thousand Japanese military men and soldiers serving in other countries were taken as prisoners of war, arrested, imprisoned, and tried as Class B and C offenders by the judicial authorities of the Soviet Union, China, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Holland, Australia and other countries.[1]

Sasakawa was one of the group of fifty-nine ordered to be detained on 2 December 1945 by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur of the United States. As noted, Sasakawa's group included Prince Nashinomoto, Hiranuma Kiichiro, and Hirota Koki. He was unusual among Class A war criminal suspects in regard to (a) the circumstances leading to his arrest; (b) his conduct while in prison; and (c) his dedication, following his release in 1948, in helping the families of convicted prisoners. He was never indicted, and that too made his case unusual [though others were similarly spared, for example Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987), a future postwar prime minister, who had served in Manchukuo before the war as an economic overlord. Another person who was released after three years, without ever being indicted, was Kodama Yoshio.]

Formally, Sasakawa did not fall into any of the special categories devised to classify the accused war criminals. He had not served in any government organization or in any quasi-governmental institution such as the Manchurian Railway. The only very slight exception was his obligatory membership in IRAPA, a duty that had been forced upon him and all other parliamentarians when serving as a single-term "non-government-sponsored" member of the House of Representatives in 1942-45.

Long before that, going back to his youth, he had done three years of compulsory military service from 1918 to 1921, rising from private to lance corporal. Other than that service, which was in peacetime, he never wore a uniform. Class A suspects were military men — top-ranking generals and admirals — cabinet ministers, businessmen, and right-wing leaders. These included Ishihara Hiroichiro, a businessman, Kodama Yoshio, and Sasakawa, all of whom were were strong characters

who had troubles with the Japanese authorities but rose to prominence nevertheless. Ishihara had served on the central council of the IRAA, and Kodama had acted as an outside or "part-time" agent of the Navy and other ministries in procuring war matériel overseas. He served briefly as a councilor of the short-lived postwar Higashikuni cabinet in 1945.

It takes two to fight

Sasakawa was unique in that he offered himself for arrest, imprisonment, and indictment as a Class A war criminal. He was open about his reasons for doing so; he wished to defend the honor of the nation against international criticism, he said. He believed that the way to keep up national pride and to maintain social order was to give testimony before the Allies-appointed International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE) and to speak out on the basic issues. [The IMFTE, it may be noted, was an ad hoc court dominated by the United States, which tried the accused war criminals from 1945 to 1948. It moved much more slowly than the trials of Nazi leaders held at Nuremburg in Germany and concluded in 1946.]

In short Sasakawa believed that responsibility for the war in East Asia and the Pacific could not be laid on Japan alone. Western powers had colonized the region for centuries and had dominated Asia to their great material advantage, and they had to share responsibility for events. He was especially critical of the Soviet Union for attacking Japanese forces in the last days of World War Two on 8 August 1945, one week before Japan's unconditional surrender, in violation of a prewar Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

To sum up, he asserted that it takes two to fight. Japan had not waged a "war of aggression," according to him. To think in such a way was hopelessly one-sided from his point of view. Human beings must struggle to survive once they are born, he maintained. To survive they must eat. To do that, given Japan's lack of resources and its large population relative to arable land, meant either to import food, or to acquire territory overseas to produce foodstuffs and raw materials, or for people to emigrate. However, the United States had suddenly erected tariff barriers in the 1930s to keep out Japanese exports, and had thereby dammed up and blocked the main source of revenue to pay for essential imports, notably oil. In addition, the US government had prohibited immigration from Japan. Thus America had "threatened our right to live. This compelled us to take the easy way out — to go into the continent [of Asia]" according to Sasakawa.[2]

All so much "spineless *konnyaku*"

Sasakawa's was an unusual voice of protest at the time. Hardly anyone else stood up to the Allies after World War Two to tell them Japan had a just cause. "The souls of the fallen soldiers can only rest in peace if others will play fair and square," said Sasakawa, citing his grievances in his diary.

> Some writers and political leaders have done great disservice to our people by sucking up to the US and by accepting their contention that we waged a war of aggression. They are the immortal enemies of the Japanese. Nosaka Sanzo is a case in point.[3] As for myself I have not once accepted the charge that Japan waged a war of aggression, I always argued otherwise. Although mine is a logically sound argument it may not be accepted at this time. When calm returns, however, the soundness of my position will become clear to all.... A couple of days ago the *Yomiuri Shimbun* carried an article by one Ishikawa Tatsuzo exaggerating the Nanjing incident.[4] By writing a piece such as that he may have curried favor but at a huge cost to all other Japanese.... Traitor Nosaka who fled the country at a critical time enjoys the limelight as a hero of the century.... Our people who treat him thus are insane. What a paltry lot we are! Before long the United States will begin to consider us unworthy of their attention. I had thought us to be a spirited lot, but no we are spineless *konnyaku*![5]

"Let Japan turn to the United States"

Sasakawa was incensed by the duplicity of those intellectuals who served as puppets of the Japanese military during the war, and turned around completely after the war to criticize Japan's "aggression."

> I have no words to sum up my feelings about those opportunistic writers who played up to the military clique in command when they held sway and flattered their bravery, and who now compromise Japan's position as the shameless turncoats unwilling to use their pens to rebut the victor's claims. Instead they have gone as far as to say that it was a war of aggression even without being invited to do so by the US Army.
>
> It is too pathetic for words. These are the real instigators of war. And yet they have the nerve to denounce us. This is what is meant by the audacity of the thief. It is wrong to think that the

> wise American military would trust those dangerous and untrustworthy characters that pay lip service to whomever is in power, but betray us in their hearts. In the near future thoughtful people will most certainly dismiss them, I am sure. Without that it is impossible to make Japan into a truly peace-loving country. It is these sorts of things that make me grieve for the future of our two countries.[6]

Such views as he expressed here might suggest that Sasakawa leaned toward exonerating the Japanese military for its conduct during the era of militarism (1931-45). However, he was a constant critic of the arrogance of the Japanese Army and the poorly managed military administration on the battlefield long before the defeat. While in prison he noted down his wish that the US Occupation not repeat the mistakes of the Japanese military and thereby damage Japan-US relations in the long run:

> Because the Japanese military clique took into their confidence only the sort of people who pleased them with flattery, they aroused the antipathy of ordinary people in Japan before long.

"General MacArthur, US officers, and men," he wrote in his diary, "do not make the same mistakes as the Japanese military. I say this in the interest of world peace."[7]

He continued:

> Japan has two options for the future: to depend on the communist Soviet Union or on the democratic United States of America. It is clear that 90 percent of the Japanese will depend on the United States and become their good brothers and sisters, if the United States acts on its promises and governs well. I earnestly pray for our people that this will be the case. In my wish to know what really went on, I made it a point every time I visited China and Manchuria during the war to ask both Japanese and Chinese with principles to give me their frank views of the Japanese military government. What I learned from them was diametrically opposed to what I read in the newspapers that toadied up to the military.
>
> That was proof that the military heard only what they wished to hear. As a result of avoiding the counsel of those who truly loved Japan and China, our military only antagonized the Chinese people, for whose good the administrative measures were intended in the first place. Fearing that we were losing the hearts of the Chinese people I gave the brass some advice. All

> they did was to ridicule me for my "myopic and mistaken views" of the Chinese. It is this sort of self-righteousness that led to our defeat in the war.[8]

"Cowardice!"

At a time when the world was entering the cold war Sasakawa held uncompromising views on the Soviets. He considered the Western powers accountable for war to the extent that they had practiced discriminatory policies against Japan, but he reserved his strongest and most vocal criticism for the Soviet Union as the true aggressor. In a passionate letter dated 6 May 1946 that he wrote from Sugamo and addressed to "Mother and my dear friends," he said:

> It is simply outrageous for the Soviet Union, the paragon of an aggressor state, to sit in judgment at a trial condemning Japan all the time as an "aggressor." Japan lost to the United States but not to the Soviet Union since we did not even fight each other. Our politicians and lawyers should advise the Soviet Union to decline the invitation of the United States to sit on the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. It is shameful that our people cannot even speak up about it.
>
> I have been looking forward to giving a piece of my mind to any Soviet judge or prosecutor who comes to investigate me, but they do not. Cowardice on the part of the Japanese is based on a very real fear that they may be imprisoned as American sympathizers in the event, however unlikely, that the United States and the USSR go to war and the United States suffers a defeat. For the same reason, namely cowardice, they do not criticize the Japan Communist Party for its insolent behavior, whatever it says.[9]

It may be hard to imagine today but not a few Japanese intellectuals believed that revolution was imminent and that a Communist government would be installed in our country. So they refrained from anticommunist remarks of any sort just after the war.

Sasakawa was stung into action. However ineffective this might be given the situation, he endeavored to get a dialog going with US leaders by writing letters to them from his prison cell. Addressing President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 30 June 1946, Sasakawa denounced the Soviet Union and stated that the participation of its judges and prosecutors in the war crimes tribunal risked undermining the neutrality of the trial:

> Japan did not fight a war with the Soviet Union, therefore it has not lost it. The Soviet Union violated the Japan-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality, advanced its troops into Manchuria and Korea, where its men invaded and plundered at will, and carried back with them a vast amount of machinery and materiél. If these acts are to be approved, the Military Tribunal of the Far East will be meaningless and unnecessary. However, as the chief aggressor, plunderer, and violator of its own international treaty, the Soviet Union unabashedly sent in its judges and prosecutors and treats Japan as "an aggressor." The Soviet Union is behaving like a robber accusing a thief, and trying him in a court. This attitude sullies the judicial process and will certainly be denounced by historians of the future....
>
> At the risk of being seized by the revengeful Soviet Union and torn to pieces, I shall continue to cry loudly until I am the last man, to demand the return of the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin to Japan in addition to all the things the Soviets plundered and carried off. Now that the Soviet Union, to whom we owe not a cent of compensation, has seized enormous property from us, I fear that we may lose our honor by failing to pay reparations to your country, the Republic of China, and other nations victimized by us, to which we do have an obligation.[10]

Let's be fair

As his criticisms against the Soviet Union indicate, Sasakawa believed that if the victor countries brought up the charges of "a crime against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity" they should be fair, and hold responsible not only the Japanese but the Allies as well in the context of history. In order to guarantee the neutrality of the process, the judges to preside over the military trial should be chosen from the neutral countries. Furthermore, Sasakawa was critical of the trial because it was predicated on ex post facto law and unfair procedures. The following are more excerpts from *Sugamo Diary:*

> The spirit of law is to punish the one and to save the many. To penalize crime under existing law is a sound principle the world over. However, if, as is said all over town, a new law is to be established in the trial of individuals to retroactively penalize them for their past deeds, its intention in fact is to bring charges against certain people. If this becomes a reality, it is a serious offense against humanity. Not only the peoples of the defeated countries, but men with a sense of justice around the world will

> hold such behavior as inimical to humankind and will forever harbor resentment. I declare that in that very moment the seeds of a Third World War will have been sown. For this reason, the defeated will be skeptical if it is the victors who try them, no matter how open and fair the trial.
>
> I believe the critical requirement for the establishment of world peace is to remove any such suspicion and conduct a trial that the whole world can be convinced of, as to its fairness. It is for the very reason of my commitment to world peace that I entreat the United States, which makes utmost efforts to establish world order, to transfer the jurisdiction to a neutral country and have the trial conducted by personnel from neutral states.[11]

Dancing for joy

Sasakawa was deeply disturbed by what he saw as illustrations of "victors' justice" being dispensed in other countries shortly after the war, for example in the Philippines:

> Trials such as that of Lieutenant General Honma Masaharu (1887-1946) raised this question of victors' justice.[12] If justice is not dispensed in the lofty spirit of the US Constitution then mankind either sets aside a claim to be holding to just principles or we let everything degenerate to a low level where all that matters is a bloody purge for revenge. The death sentence against General Honma was clearly a choice for the latter option. I cannot take part in it. Nor can I acquiesce by keeping silent on this. Both General Yamashita Takebumi and General Honma were executed without due process and as such their treatment will open the way to a series of legalized lynchings.[13]

Sasakawa tried to see Japan in a broad scope and to lift himself above the preoccupations of daily events. He believed, coming down to bedrock, that the existence of Japan's imperial system, as marked by the physical person of the emperor, was essential for good order and the rehabilitation of the shattered nation. Society, he believed, was in danger of breaking up.

To avert disaster, he believed, it was essential that the US Occupation not pursue the topic of the emperor's responsibility for the war and at all costs avoid summoning him to the court. Therefore, "he wept with joy" when he learned through a report in the *Tokyo Shimbun* on 21 June 1946 that Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan had stated that he would

not summon the Emperor to be tried at the IMTFE. Sasakawa recorded in his diary:

> This American policy is the only way to go for the rebirth of Japan.... America in its wisdom has understood the heart of the Japanese people and has allowed us to keep the imperial system and decided against the arrest of the Emperor. What a great happiness for Japan, mind you this is not negative for America. I felt greatly relieved at the Keenan statement so much so that I had nothing more to worry about even if I were to be executed tomorrow.[14]

In a letter dated 29 July that same year, written to an acquaintance in his hometown, Sasakawa shared his state of mind: "My objective has been achieved and I literally danced for joy."[15]

Concern for the Showa emperor

Not that that was an end to the matter. Sasakawa, never fully at ease, was constantly concerned that the emperor might be accused of having responsibility for the war. He feared that not a few among the Class A war criminal suspects, who had lived a life of plenty as elite power-holders or had enjoyed aristocratic status, just might testify unwisely, seeking to ingratiate themselves with the Allied Powers in order to escape execution or heavy prison sentences. These defendants might not be cowardly but they lacked experience in answering questions from prosecutors in court and they might inadvertently offer testimonies that would hurt the emperor. Sasakawa's prewar experience of a successful legal battle fought over six years, of which three years were spent in prison, gave him impregnable confidence and a sense of mission that he alone could prevent the worst from happening.

Getting himself arrested

Sasakawa appears to have had not the slightest doubt about the course of action on which he was embarking. Knowing what he did, and having a feel for the future, he embarked on the extraordinary project of volunteering for arrest as a Class A war criminal suspect. This was indeed a bold decision given his background. How could he demonstrate his culpability? He had not even once occupied a government post and his small PPP, while it had conducted itself in a flamboyant manner under his leadership, had always stayed within the legal limits as a political group.

As a right-wing organization it had little or, better said, zero impact on the government's war strategy. In fact far from having influence on affairs of state the PPP was considered a pesky little undesirable organization by some in the government particularly after war with the United States began in December 1941. In a letter written by Fuji Yoshio, a key PPP member, and addressed to Sasakawa when the latter was in prison in the early summer of 1946, Fuji recalled that "during the war the military hierarchy bore down upon our PPP members starting from *sensei* [meaning Sasakawa] and going on down to all the rest of us."[16]

Up to a short time prior to his arrest late in autumn 1945, so common sense suggests, there was hardly any possibility of him being detained — and made a Class A war criminal suspect along with Japan's war leaders. Fully aware of this Sasakawa set out to provoke the Occupation authorities. In October-November 1945 he organized twenty or so speeches in Osaka and he, then and there, announced on public platforms that he volunteered to be arrested as a Class A war criminal — an action of remarkable audacity.[17]

"Why do I wish to be arrested?"

What did he say? And how exactly did he express himself? There are no exact records of these speeches — military censorship no doubt prevented their publication in the newspapers — but once in prison in December 1945 Sasakawa volunteered the following summary in a document that he submitted to the International Prosecution Section (IPS), an organ of the Occupation working to gather material for the trials to come. He wrote:

> An elected representative of the people has an obligation to give explanations to the voters on important issues. For this reason I spoke to my audiences in Osaka in autumn 1945 about the truth of the defeat in the war and I laid bare the secrets of the political world. The gist of my speeches was as follows: The Japanese Army had not carried out research on new weapons. It had failed to send large aircraft forces to destroy enemy bases overseas and to prevent enemy planes from bombing the homeland of Japan. Our forces failed, likewise to attack the US mainland....
>
> In the postwar era there are only two choices for Japan, either to go the Soviet way of communism or to go the American way of democracy. Now, why do I wish to be arrested?
>
> There is no one more suspicious than the Japanese. If I am not arrested and simply organize a movement of some kind and contact the General Head Quarters (GHQ), Japanese people

> will not trust me. They will see me as just another opportunist toadying to the Allies. On the other hand, if I am arrested and then acquitted after having squarely stated my convictions in a public trial I will win their trust. Thereafter I can then be in touch daily with MacArthur Headquarters and escape any suspicion. It is for this reason I wish to be imprisoned at an early stage.[18]

A more audacious communication can hardly be imagined, but Sasakawa was drawn willy-nilly to the center of events. Not that it is easy to picture exactly how events were unfolding at the time. Yamaoka has furnished a very different record of what Sasakawa was saying in his speeches in Osaka in autumn 1945 by way of seizing the attention of the Occupation authorities:

> In Japan many people starved to death during famines, even when our population was only about 25 to 26 million as in the early Meiji Era. Our population has nearly tripled today, so it is only natural that we do not have enough food to feed our people. Human beings do have the right to live, however. There are only two choices before us, either to produce more food at home or to build up foreign trade, export a lot, and purchase food with the proceeds. Now who was it who blocked these two paths?...
>
> If the Allies determine us to be aggressors then we would be condemned as accomplices of immorality and those who have given their lives for the country would have died in vain.
> This must be prevented at all cost otherwise we would have committed an inexcusable blunder against the souls of the departed war heroes as well as our ancestors. Now, hear me well, the ministers and generals who are being arrested one after the other are all fine people but they lack experience in court. If we leave things to them, we will be condemned as aggressors. Well, I have had the experience of spending three years in prison and of winning acquittal at the end of four trials in four years. That is why, I must be arrested as a war criminal so that I can coach the defendants and unify their thoughts.
>
> Fortunately, we have here in the audience members of the Occupation forces, accompanied by stenographers and interpreters. With such reliable witnesses at hand I can be confident that I shall be taken to prison as a war criminal. Once in prison I will serve my country to the best of my ability by stating why the

> Japanese are not aggressors. I ask you my voters, to raise a toast for Japan if you hear of my arrest.[19]

Amazing! Sasakawa no doubt repeated these remarks in many speeches he delivered in Osaka. Certainly the Occupation was being provoked by the speaker. The Occupation authorities, in fact, compiled a dossier on Sasakawa stating that he made a speech in Minoo City, his hometown near Osaka, on 21 October 1945. In that address he called on his audience "not to obey the present Japanese government, which is collaborating with the Occupation."[20]

Sasakawa gained his objective. A document dated 4 December 1945 bearing the signature of James J. Gain Jr., Captain in charge of Information, summarized the grounds for arrest:

> Sasakawa should be arrested for the following reasons: first, for leading campaigns instigating aggression, nationalism, and hostility against the United States. And second, for his continued vigorous activities in an organization that strongly impedes the development of democracy in Japan."[21]

Of the reasons given for his arrest, the first refers by implication to his activities during and up to the end of the war, and the second tells of Sasakawa's success in provoking the Occupation authorities.

A dangerous person?

In the years that followed he instilled into the US military in Japan a sense that he was a dangerous person. This is indicated by material dating to July 1947. US Army General Staff Section II, G-2, in charge of intelligence, public peace and censorship referred to Sasakawa Ryoichi in its "top secret" document and concluded:

> In any case, Sasakawa appears to pose a potential danger to the future of Japanese politics.... In consideration of his past words and deeds and the danger he poses in the future G-2 should thoroughly investigate his case, including the possibility of indictment.[22]

This report can be seen as further evidence of Sasakawa's success in provoking the Occupation authorities, not that he ever managed to be indicted as we shall see shortly.

His main achievement was his arrest. This event found mention in the *New York Times* of 4 December 1945 — on the day it took place — in an article by Burton Crane. He reported: "At least one of the war crimi-

nals on General MacArthur's latest list feels honored that he was to be so accused. Sasakawa Ryoichi, ultra-nationalist, declared: "To be named by the Allied Army as a war criminal is eloquent proof that I devoted my whole self to the prosecution of the war." He added that all those on the list were "first-class Japanese."[23]

These words are powerful testimonies to the way the occupying US forces viewed Sasakawa.

II

On the day he turned himself in Sasakawa spoke first to his supporters in front of his office on Ginza. He then proceeded to Sugamo Prison by car accompanied by a truck displaying a huge, white banner that read "A Farewell Celebration" and bearing a brass band playing naval marches. The truck was filled with members of the Japan Workers Alliance, Sasakawa's party under its new name, and youth from a Student Cultural Confederation. If anything, he entered prison like a victorious general returning from a brilliantly successful campaign — in marked contrast to the rest of the newly charged Class A suspects. Here is how he began his parting speech before setting out to Sugamo from his Ginza office:

> I experienced no sense of alarm or fear when I learned that my name had been added to the list of suspected war criminals and that General MacArthur had given the Japanese government a warrant for my arrest. I simply accepted my fate as a matter of course. I was prepared for this and so I had my formal Japanese wear, my *haori* bearing my family crest and my *hakama,* sent up from Osaka. I shall meet my fate as a proud Japanese. I feel a sense of ease that my imprisonment has come about — even a sensation of joy for having achieved my wish....
>
> My dear comrades, consider yourselves dead as of August 15. Yield to no one and never be defeated. Be resolute in fighting for the reconstruction of Japan.[24]

The cheerful five-mile procession that followed through the bombed-out streets of Tokyo to Sugamo — with the brass band playing all the way — must have seemed a deliberate act of provocation to the Occupation authorities. The day after Sasakawa arrived in prison he faced an angry interrogator who struck him in the face and shouted, "Don't you know you belong to a defeated nation?... How come you deliberately make fun of the authorities?" The interrogator accused him of making light of the Occupation in three ways. "First, you made an aggressive farewell speech to your followers full of challenging remarks.... Second, you

squared your shoulders and bragged to journalists in the Diet when the names of the Class A war criminals were announced saying "I passed the test! Congratulate me. I shall enter prison in formal attire." Third, "you had the nerve to bring a band and cheering supporters with you."[25]

Professor Royama's evidence

Another reason for Sasakawa's arrest, his provocative behavior apart, was that many informers had volunteered information against him, and these reports gained credibility among Occupation officials. Anonymous denunciations were frequent in those days. People had scores to settle. Sasakawa was certainly not the only target and the stories about him were often misleading and vague but some had their roots in the prewar years and were harshly critical.

An Occupation era memo exists dated 10 December 1945 and addressed to an officer from the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) 90th Capital Corps, Army Post Office (APO-660). The memo to the officer, who questioned Sasakawa in prison, summed up what various sources said: "A number of informants alleged that the Patriotic People's Party (PPP) was one of the most active groups that advocated military rule and Sasakawa Ryoichi was its leader."[26]

Some informants made themselves known to the authorities by name. A file of the International Prosecution Section (IPS), a key unit under the Occupation, notes that one Kakehi Mitsuaki, the deputy editor of a publication called by its English title *Contemporary Japan*, reported to the Occupation that Sasakawa was the leader of a political group called the PPP and was the only member of parliament from the party. Kakehi alleged that the party received financial assistance from the Kokuryukai (familiarly known to foreign scholars as the Black Dragon Society) and was its offshoot.

The group, he added, had also received financial aid and support from the Police and Security Bureau of the Interior Ministry as well as from the Military Services Bureau of the Army Ministry. In addition Sasakawa was said to be the mastermind of the National Workers' Alliance (Zenkoku Kinrosha Domei). The union ran large-scale public relations campaigns, put up posters, distributed leaflets and organized public gatherings based on neighborhood associations. Orators appealed for support for the imperial system, anticommunism, and liberal democracy. However, the slogan "liberal democracy" was generally considered to be a smoke screen to hide the true objectives of the union, according to Kakehi.[27]

Another of those who chimed in was Professor Royama Masamichi, formerly professor at Tokyo University and then editor-in-chief of *Chuo Koron*, a prominent intellectual monthly magazine. He offered the fol-

lowing information on 8 November 1945 ahead of Sasakawa's arrest, claiming that the PPP, Sasakawa's group, was an extremely reactionary political party that gathered workers not organized by labor unions. It had acted in collusion with Kokuryukai. Though the party was dissolved after the war, the entire organization was taken over by the National Workers' Alliance.

The Alliance's formal leaders, Fuji Yoshio and Yoshimatsu Masakatsu, were henchmen of Sasakawa. The funds of the National Workers' Alliance appeared to have been rapidly amassing thanks to earnings by Sasakawa on the mainland of China.... Further, it was rumored that Sasakawa and the National Allied Workers' Alliance were closely tied to Kodama Yoshio's Japan National Party (Nihon Kokumin-to). During the war Sasakawa had colluded, Royama maintained, with the Japanese Army and conducted business on its behalf, while remaining a civilian. The Army had given him an aircraft, which Sasakawa flew to China frequently. With the permission of the Army, he had rigged a deal for good quality coal from Taiwan and had sold it to the mainland at exorbitant prices.

Furthermore, this testimony continued, Sasakawa had collected vast amounts of copper ore through forfeiture — with the collusion of the Army and the military police. These supplies were ostensibly for arms production, but the copper was auctioned off to the highest bidder without establishing what it would be used for. Through these bold speculative ventures, concluded Royama, Sasakawa had amassed a fortune of anything between 200 million and 500 million yen.[28]

Rumors do fly. It is clear today that this information was basically wrong. Sasakawa hardly ever had any contact with the right wing as represented by the Black Dragon Society. A genealogical map of right wing groups, compiled by Takahashi Masahira for an encyclopedia article in 1980, treats Sasakawa's PPP as independent from other right-wing groups.[29]

The two organizations, the PPP and the Black Dragon Society, appear at opposite ends of the genealogical map, showing no existing ties. In fact the Black Dragon Society barely functioned by the start of the Showa era (1926-89). It had become a shadow of its former self.

Sasakawa was largely on his own in the world of right-wing groups. A 1952 reference work titled *Who's Who of Contemporary Japan,* edited by Abe Shinnosuke, has this to say in connection with the right-wing groups of the modern period: "The genealogy of the right wing may be classified into: a group headed by Toyama Mitsuru (1855-1944) and Uchida Ryohei (1874-1937); a group lead by Uesugi Shinkichi (1878-1929) and Takahata Motoyuki (1886-1928); and then a group dominated by Kita Ikki (1883-1937) and Okawa Shumei (1886-1957), but Sasakawa does not belong to any of them."[30]

All in all, it is impossible to see how Sasakawa's PPP could have developed from the Black Dragon Society or have received funds from it. Simply put the chronology does not work.

The Black Dragon Society

Japanese right-wing genealogies intrigue the outside world and none more than this group. The Black Dragon Society was organized prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and is best known for favoring Japan's advance into the continent especially against Russia. It had a direct line of descent from the Genyosha, the first right-wing society in Japan established in 1881.

Headed by two charismatic leaders, Toyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryohei, it was long considered outside Japan to be a large and powerful organization even when it had in reality already dwindled away to a nominal existence by the Showa Era. Kokuryu-kai (Amur River Society would be a conventional translation of its name) took its name from the Amur River, which flows along the Manchurian and Far East Russian border. The name of the group can be rendered in English as Black Dragon Society, based upon the literal reading of the *kanji* for Amur River. The sensational name helped to give to Westerners an exaggerated idea overseas of its existence as some kind of omniscient, all-powerful Japanese mafia or gang.

Making a gift of an airfield

As noted in the previous chapter Sasakawa was tracked and persecuted by the police and by the much-feared military police — and detained without charges for three years (1935-38). He never received official support. He built up connections, however, with the military leadership. As a patriotic gesture, we have seen, Sasakawa presented the Army with an airfield he set up in the Kansai in the early 1930s and even with aircraft shortly before war broke out. But to my knowledge there is no record that he was offered the use of aircraft by the Army. Sasakawa did visit China and other countries before and during the war flying himself.

There is no evidence that I know of that Sasakawa accumulated wealth in collusion with the armed services — as did Kodama Yoshio, who served as a "part-time" and very effective employee of the Army and Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, created the Kodama Agency — a one-man trading company in strategic commodities, and amassed vast fortunes in China.

His inclinations seem to have run in precisely the opposite direction. A key episode that came on the very eve of the Pacific War, suggests as much. In November 1941, so the story goes, Sasakawa received a sud-

den, extremely urgent request from Lieutenant General Yamagata of the Navy Air Command to procure military matériel for the war.

The Imperial Navy was desperate to stock up on key materials in short supply in anticipation of an outbreak of hostilities. It was a war profiteer's dream and it was not for Sasakawa. He turned aside the request, saying that he was not good at such matters, and in his place, he introduced none other than Kodama Yoshio. With this sudden new business as a turning point, Kodama proceeded to build up his celebrated if notorious agency.[31] Sasakawa took care to avoid having any connection with government-related business.

Evidence to indict?

Sasakawa's next objectives, once he had himself arrested, was to get himself indicted as a Class A war criminal suspect, to stand trial and to give testimony in court. However, this was more easily said than done. G-2, one of the key units in the Occupation hierarchy under General MacArthur, recommended that indictment be considered in Sasakawa's case as noted.

But the powerful International Prosecution Section (IPS) within the ruling camp in Tokyo found that there was no clear evidence against Sasakawa to support an indictment. That is to say, all the claims that repeatedly appeared in files on Sasakawa lacked any concrete evidence to back them up. For example, it had been alleged that Sasakawa and the PPP had campaigned to abolish the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty; that the party had joined in planning Japan's southward military push in 1941; that Sasakawa made a deal with the Wang Zhaoming regime in China. None of these grand geopolitical allegations was provable.

The same applied to frequent allegations such as that Sasakawa's solo visit to Italy and Germany in late 1939-40 was to build up the Axis Alliance: he promoted aggression against China; that he participated in planning the war against the Allied powers; that he was one of the most powerful leaders of the prewar fascist movement in Japan; and that he was a powerful advocate of the Great East Asia War. All these claims and contentions collapsed on inspection or could not be verified by the powerful US legal team in Tokyo, they found.[32]

Then what was to become of Sasakawa's project to get prosecuted and testify to the court? Sasakawa explained to his second son, Takashi, his true intention in volunteering for arrest as a Class A war criminal:

> Those designated as war criminals have had the experience of sending many people to jail, but it will be their very first time to experience anything of the kind themselves. I had misgivings

> about the possibility of them making inappropriate remarks that might have a damaging effect on His Majesty the Emperor. With my experience of three years in jail, I felt that I could squarely assert Japan's position and I could also give technical guidance to the war criminal suspects [on how to conduct themselves in court].[33]

His enormous self-confidence was based on experience. According to Sasakawa some of the Class B and C lesser war offenders protested to him that,

> if only General Tojo had changed places with Sasakawa *sensei,* the latter would have done a good job of explaining how Japanese military discipline demands absolute obedience. The Americans would have understood and would not have convicted them for actions carried out under orders. These B and C war criminals need not have been detained in the first place, they considered.[34]

Who will speak out?

Godo Takuo, a Class A war criminal suspect who had served in key cabinet posts running the economy in the Hayashi Senjuro and Abe Nobuyuki cabinets, confided in Sasakawa, telling him of his doubts about his fellow defendants and their willingness to speak up.

> The twenty-eight defendants who just came in are reluctant to speak their minds. They want to protect themselves as they still have plenty of worldly ambitions. This does great harm to Japan. The few who have nerves are decisive, but they are poor talkers. If you were with the group they would cheer up and the result could be good for Japan. Unfortunately they will not put you on trial.[35]

Togo Shigenori, the former foreign minister who was criticized harshly for imputing blame to others during the Tokyo trial, was said to have told Sasakawa: "If only you had been with us during the trial all of us defendants would have had the benefit of your leadership and would have come out more favorably."[36]

All this was deeply vexing to him. Sasakawa had wished not only to be arrested as a Class A war criminal, but to be indicted as a defendant so as to have an opportunity to state his case in court. He observed that other inmates became nervous, when they learned of their possible indictments:

> During our walk [in the prison yard], Ohta Kozo constantly asked me and Aoki Kazuo what we thought he would be charged with or why he ended up in the first group of Class A. I told him to consider himself lucky. It was better to be indicted earlier as a Class A suspect because the minor ones were called later. I told him I would gladly pay 50,000 yen to be indicted with Mr. Tojo and stand trial early on. People think the opposite. Why, if you have not done anything wrong, should you be afraid? We should be glad of the prestige of being tried at the international court.[37]

Sasakawa was profoundly disappointed. Contrary to his wishes, the days and months sped by without him being indicted. There simply was no evidence that he had played a leading role in the conduct of the war. He noted in his diary:

> Everyone is looking thin and haggard after being served a bill of indictment. They must be worried. There would be no cause to worry if one lived in such a way that investigation brought out only good acts. That's me. I grieve that I cannot stand trial with Mr. Tojo.[38]

> If only they allowed me to stand public trial I would first of all challenge the judge and prosecutor from the Soviet Union, which is guilty of aggression and violation of law. I would then stress that the Allied attack on Japan had inflicted great damage on the Japanese, and demand that Japanese judges be allowed to participate in the trial. But would the defendants ever have the energy to speak up in these terms and voice the absolute essential? This worries me.[39]

As a last resort

Things were not going well for Sasakawa. As a last resort, he wrote a letter to General MacArthur, asking the general to serve a "supplementary indictment" on him personally.[40]

As might be expected this demarche came to nothing. He felt driven to the brink and shared his desperation in a letter dated 3 June 1946 addressed to Fuji Yoshio and colleagues of the old PPP:

> I have written to General MacArthur entreating him for a supplementary indictment, but to this day nothing has happened. I have not slept for two whole nights suffering from grave apprehension over this and that. Crying does not get me anywhere. I am going through the most searing agony in forty-eight years of

> my life. As a result I have twice as much white hair as a month ago. Imagine the pain I am going through.[41]

As a final despairing attempt he wrote letters referred to earlier, addressed to President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In the letters Sasakawa explained:

> I am sorry to say General MacArthur has not granted me the indictment I requested for the sole purpose of challenging the tyrannical Soviet Union, to reflect seriously on its conduct, thereby making the trial meaningful and contributing albeit in a small way to world peace.[42]

Working with Tojo

Once it became clear that he was not going to be indicted, Sasakawa took a deep breath and switched tactics. He decided to work on those who faced formal charges, Tojo Hideki in particular. The latter, a full army general, had been the prime minister and effective commander-in-chief at the start of the war in December 1941, i.e., at the time of Pearl Harbor. Sasakawa's idea was to let Tojo state Japan's case in a dignified manner and to confirm the innocence of the emperor as regards the war. His correspondence at that time testifies to his concern. Sasakawa wrote to Yoshimatsu Masakatsu of the PPP:

> I used my seniority, as I considered it, for having done time in prison before, to share my own experience with Tojo from the very beginning of our imprisonment in Sugamo. I urged him repeatedly to first of all make sure that responsibility does not fall on the emperor; and secondly, to stress that ours was a war of self-defense; and thirdly, to make vividly clear that certain nations — the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Burma, and Vietnam — gained their independence. Japan's sacrifice had liberated Asia.
>
> Then, fourthly, he was to speak up against the high-handedness of the victors, prompting their self-reflection. And then finally, with great presence of mind, he was to walk to the gallows, shout *banzai* three times for His Majesty and the people, and go to his death.... Most people are quick to heap abuse on Mr. Tojo, but once in prison he became philosophical and accepted his fate. I offered him all the sympathy and support I could.[43]

According to Sasakawa, Tojo welcomed his advice as the following passage found in *Expressions of Sugamo:*

Whenever there was a chance, I shared my experience and thoughts with Tojo saying: "You stand in the face of national criticism and ridicule. I am sorry to think what your family must be going through. You can save your family from shame by how you conduct yourself in court.

"You will not escape the death penalty. You must know better than to hope to walk free from Sugamo, don't ever dream of it.

"If it is written that you must die, take all responsibility upon you. I expect the United States not to be so foolish as to drag the emperor to the court, but there are some blockheads instigated by the Communist Party demanding that he be hanged.

"Please believe that there is no one but you in Japan today who can defend the emperor. Please fearlessly and squarely state the case of Japan as your conscience dictates. If you are convinced that this war was a war of self-defense then use the microphone in the court to shout your conviction to the whole world. Most people believe that they stand to lose by incurring the hatred of the judge if they speak bluntly without mincing words. My own experience in fighting at a trial tells me the opposite. A defendant has the right to explain himself, even if he is under no obligation to make a statement.

"The last victory to be won is to speak the truth courageously.

"It is most important for you to do this."

I repeated this to him again and again and each time he listened quietly.[44]

Building up mutual trust

At first Sasakawa had not trusted Tojo because of his earlier encounter with the general when he was a "non-government-recommended" member of parliament. He wrote in his diary on 10 April 1946:

> General Tojo does not have what it takes to explain Japan's position fairly. If I were present and on trial I would have the confidence to take the floor to explain and convince the world that it was not a war of aggression. Without this the war victims would have died in vain.[45]

Sasakawa sharply criticized Tojo in a document he submitted to the International Prosecution Section, i.e., the US prosecutors:

> Having had to face few adversities in life, he tends to be haughty in times of good fortune but (referring to his humiliating deportment on his arrest) is unable to see an inch ahead when things go against him. He has strong likes and dislikes and would not appoint worthy people to high office, if they happened to oppose his views. Instead, he gave important posts to his friends.[46]

By "his humiliating deportment on his arrest" Sasakawa meant Tojo's failed attempt to commit suicide by a pistol. Sasakawa was greatly reassured, therefore, when Tojo more than met his expectations on delivering his statement in court. In a letter to Fuji Yoshio of the PPP in January 1948, Sasakawa wrote:

> The interrogation of Mr. Tojo in court was a great success. He made good use of my advice. That is to say, most of my reasons for going to prison in the first place have been achieved. I am glad about that.[47]

Tojo appeared to be grateful for Sasakawa's "guidance" and advice, so he noted in *Expressions of Sugamo:*

> Immediately after Tojo completed his statement I met him at Ichigaya [where the trial took place]. He indeed looked cheerful. Usually it was my place to initiate a conversation but he walked up to me and took my hand.
>
> "Sasakawa, fortunately the emperor is spared. I did my very best at the witness stand and said all I had to say. The only regret I have is that I was not allowed to go back in history and talk deeply about it. But that is beyond my responsibility.
>
> "In any case, I am profoundly grateful to you for sharing in full detail your experience in public trials and encouraging me to the very last, because you gave me useful information that served me well. I have nothing but admiration for your resolute attitude.
>
> "I wish, therefore, to thank you and to express my gratitude to your mother for bearing and raising a strong man like you. Since I do not have the freedom to thank her in person in this world, I have written a poem in her honor. Is it all right to present it to her," he asked, "as a gesture of appreciation?"
>
> I could not control my tears when he said, "I do not have the freedom to thank her in person in this world."
>
> "Yes, please send it to her. Mother will be very pleased," I replied. He then showed me the poem:

Moso bamboo teaches us to defend what is right.
Noble, it holds up under spring snow.

As Tojo promised, this verse was delivered to my mother at her home on the outskirts of Osaka.[48]

On New Year's Day in 1948, as a token of gratitude for his advice and encouragement Tojo had already presented Sasakawa with a ***haiku*** he had written:

Eternal noble presence
hath Fuji
this New Year.

Tojo said: "Sasakawa san, 'Fuji' means you."[49]

III

Later in life Sasakawa was criticized by some for his unconventional behavior in going out of his way to be arrested and then trying to get indicted as a Class A war criminal. He was accused of grandstanding. After all, he fully expected to be acquitted, it was said. At the time, however, the common understanding in Japan was that arrest and indictment as a Class A war criminal suspect carried a high possibility of the death sentence.

Kishi Nobusuke, who was destined to serve as prime minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960, was another Class A war crime suspect who was never indicted. His comment on his position inside Sugamo Prison reflects the general uncertainty that the accused must have felt. Kishi wrote:

> "Pondering on the outcome of the trial and considering death as a possible outcome gives a different prospect, even though I am prepared for the eventuality.... The trial is being conducted by the arbitrary will of the other party.... A wish to live to the last causes me extreme anxiety. The topic of death, therefore, grips my mind in a different way.[50]

Kodama suffers

Kodama Yoshio, who had been jailed a number of times before the war, spent hard and uneasy times in Sugamo Prison as a Class A suspected war criminal. He found the uncertainty very hard to take:

In retrospect the three years at the prison were extremely painful and seemed awfully long. Although it was just a matter of three years, it felt more like ten or even fifteen years. This probably had much to do with not having any prospect of knowing the outcome. I imagined that if the worst case meant the maximum penalty or life imprisonment, then even a light punishment would be thirty years....

Furthermore, we had no guidance even as to when the trial would begin. It was under these conditions of psychological uncertainty that scores of us Class A suspects were thrown into detention over a long period.

While a one-sided trial proceeded [for the Class A defendants] at the Ichigaya court [in Tokyo] in the name of justice and humanity, another [quite separate] military court [25 miles away] in Yokohama tried Class B and C suspects [much more quickly], sentencing them to twenty or thirty years of hard labor for just striking prisoners of war.

As we considered these harsh sentences handed down by the Allied Powers, and as we contemplated the truly miserable state of Japan in its defeat, each day at Sugamo, from beginning to end, was filled with mental anguish and a feeling of dread.

If it were just a personal problem, one might have been able to resign oneself to fate and prepare for death, but we were so powerless, and at our wit's end at the thought of how we came to be labeled as war criminals. Indeed, the whole country was under the heel of an unseen huge power. Under the circumstances, it was only in sleep that I was liberated from all the aches and pains of the real world as seen from Sugamo day after day. Yet the dreams I dreamed from time to time gave me small relief.[51]

A slight contradiction

Sasakawa himself assumed that he would not come out alive. He prepared his own grave next to his father's, in his hometown of Minoo City, and he had a commemorative photograph taken with Shizue. He gave thought to her situation, leaving land in Tokyo and considerable assets to pay for her needs, but Fuji Yoshio and other old PPP colleagues used it all up, because according to Shizue they were certain that Sasakawa would not return alive.[52]

To suggest that it was all grandstanding on Sasakawa's part because he was expecting to be acquitted, is being wise after the event, and

ignores the circumstances in a mean and suspicious way. In fact, neither Sasakawa nor those around him expected him to emerge from prison in one piece. "Nobody wants to go to prison," he said, "especially if arrested as a war criminal. One's prospects are uncertain and those with a guilty conscience worry themselves sick over ways to escape indictment.[53]

Judging by the entries in his diary and statements he made before the International Prosecution Section, Sasakawa had a clear conscience and believed in his innocence. "What wrong did Sasakawa Ryoichi do up to this day?" he asked rhetorically in what he supposed was his farewell speech made outside his Ginza office on the day of his arrest.[54]

Sasakawa forcefully asserted his innocence not just in regard to "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity," but also in the matter of a "crime against peace," another choice phrase used by the US prosecutors.

If he were innocent though, then he should not have been arrested. Sasakawa's attitude was contradictory in form and logic. But to lie on these points would have been to go against his essential purpose of pursuing the question of the deceptiveness of the Tokyo trial. Sasakawa was confident that he could argue the case of Japan because he was not guilty of anything.

He was nothing if not confident as a person. We know his caustic characterization of Tojo Hideki. Here are some more of his thumbnail sketches of notables of that era. All these men were war criminal suspects and he did not mince his words in describing them when asked to do so by the US prosecutors. The latter kept their notes on his brief remarks:

- Yuzawa Michio, former minister of interior: "Has a fondness for sake and women, and likes to spend other people's money, and not his own. He is a stingy man...but lacking in courage to do anything very bad."
- Hoshino Naoki, former chief cabinet secretary: "A dwarf of a man. Employed by Tojo till the end, but insignificant not worthy even of mention."
- Arima Yoriyasu, former minister of agriculture and forestry: "Has a fondness for radical action, but no intelligence...and is often taken advantage of...unimportant figure, considered to be weak-willed."
- Shimada Shigetaro, former minister of the Navy: "Appears brilliant, but in fact disappointing. He is a man who obeyed Tojo in everything.... Made appointments in the Navy as Tojo willed."

- Ino Hiroya, former minister of agriculture and forestry: "Has a fondness for women, and toadies up to Tojo like a houseboy. His attitude to Tojo in parliament was painful to watch. He is an opportunist who panders to powerful men."
- Iwamura Michiyo, former minister of justice: "Obeyed all orders given by Tojo. But had a hard time, sandwiched between Tojo and his subordinates, who opposed such opportunism.
- Aoki Kazuo, former minister of state: "An insignificant person. They say Aoki is responsible for the inflationary Chinese economy. When Colonel Tsuji Masanobu threatened to kill him with a sword he fled petrified. This is another cowardly person."
- Goto Fumio, former minister of the interior: "A henchman of Izawa Takio [former superintendent-general of the Metropolitan Police; former governor of Taiwan; and a member of the Privy Council], rumored to be a seeker after distinction, who listens to high officials but not civilians and a doyen of the Interior Ministry who arrested many who opposed his boss."[55]

Of the seventy-three people covered in his statement, Sasakawa had very few to praise without reservation. They were:

- Shigemitsu Mamoru, former foreign minister: "The best person of the present day."
- Kishi Nobusuke, "A wise man and among the best of the Tojo circle...more daring than most."
- Ayukawa Gisuke, entrepreneur: "An important figure among businessmen, and has grand conceptions that take people by surprise."
- Kuhara Fusanosuke: "An "important figure with intelligence and courage."
- Mazaki Jinzaburo: "A true warrior... not expected to change sides and can be trusted."
- Toyoda Fukutake: "A man of spirit."
- Murata Shozo, a former businessman: "A fine man with courage for a businessman."
- Yasuoka Masa'atsu, former scholar: "An upright...courageous scholar who can be trusted."[56]

A cautious witness

These character sketches tell one about Sasakawa. He was a fairly unrelenting observer and he did not pull his punches in describing people, even when addressing the prosecutors. However, while severely criticizing and castigating many of the suspects, he offered no information on specific events that could be used against them in court. Captain Samuel B. Healy, who examined the interrogation records, stated that he "could not find any testimony that had evidential value."[57] Sasakawa knew well how to respond to interrogation without telling a lie and without putting himself or others at a disadvantage, even while seeming to offer juicy information.

He was "a player on the stage." On occasion Sasakawa hurled abuse at fellow suspects, and one senses that he was using tactics he learned in court to give the prosecutor an impression of their insignificance and thereby to win verdicts of not guilty for the accused. For example, Sasakawa showed contempt for Arima Yoriyasu, the former Minister of Agriculture, whom he had disparaged as "insignificant" and "weak-willed."

He remarked of Arima:

> The Allies brought him here [to Sugamo] because he had served as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry but it was simply his turn to take the post. Why bring that fellow here? He is not worth even a Class B or Class C suspect let alone a Class A one. The rest of us mock him, calling him "the incompetent Mr. Oh no!" [based on a reading of the Chinese characters of his name]. It's sickening to have him among us, get him out of here![58]

Using these words Sasakawa may have had some stratagem to spare the luckless Arima further trouble. The inspiration for his contemptuous remarks about Yuzawa Michio ("lacking in courage to do anything very bad") and Hoshino Naoki ("insignificant, not worthy even of mention") may have sprung from similar tactical intentions of deflecting the Allied prosecutors from troubling certain individuals Sasakawa wished to help.

Two badgers in the same burrow?

Here we may consider how Sasakawa and Kodama were seen by Awaya Kentaro, who worked during the Occupation as an editor of the English texts of Class A suspects' responses under interrogation, and had read the prosecution's files on their questioning. He found something that surprised him very much:

> There was a large gap between the real and false images. The heroic tales circulated by them and their friends about the gallant pair dauntlessly facing their interrogators had become legendary and intrinsic to their Sugamo experience. The prosecutors' documentary materials expose these two as being submissive and defensive.[59]

This assessment applies in good measure to one of the two, namely, Kodama, as I shall duly explain. Sasakawa, however, is not to be put in the same category or class as his longtime friend Kodama.

To have done so was a mistake on the part of the interrogators resulting from a failure to understand Sasakawa's strategy of pushing for indictment while believing his own innocence — and from his successful court tactics. Basically a misunderstanding came about, I consider, because of Sasakawa's words and deeds. He worked far outside the intellectual frame of reference of Awaya. The latter was trapped by a preconceived idea that Sasakawa and Kodama were "badgers in the same burrow" or belong to the same gang.

A fair trial, please

In fact, Sasakawa spoke out vehemently and persistently on general topics he cared about, while Kodama was the one who kept his mouth shut on political issues. Sasakawa was outspoken, while Kodama was timid. Nothing held Sasakawa back when it came to telling the prosecutors his opinions on two major topics, the injustice of the Tokyo trial and the beastliness of the Soviet Union.

Sasakawa believed that "if the United States of America wishes to make the Japanese into true lovers of peace, then it must first win their trust. And the only way for the US to do so is to keep its word."

Starting from this perspective on the Occupation, Sasakawa made a list of contentious items for the US prosecutors that he titled "Proposed Ways to Dispel the Misgivings of the [Japanese] People."

The list was lengthy:

- "The public had discovered that US censorship of the press was even harsher than under the Tojo government [during the war]."
- "The Japanese wanted to know how America, which claims to respect the will of the people, could justify arresting and interrogating an elected representative of the people [meaning Sasakawa], especially during a session of the Diet."
- "The public wanted to know on what law and on what grounds civilians were being arraigned and tried."

- "The Japanese wondered how the United States, which claims to respect human rights, could imprison people without even reading to them a written indictment beyond asking their name, domicile, and profession.... If such careless handling of arrests is kept up, then people may want to go to prison simply to get free food and lodging."
- "A trial by the victors of the defeated, no matter how fairly it is conducted, will fail to do away with the misgivings of the loser. If the United States wishes to be recognized by the whole world as a truly fair nation that respects due process, then the trial must be conducted strictly and only by citizens of neutral countries and not by the victors."

Thus Sasakawa listed his blunt criticisms of Occupation policies and practices. Most of his statement was not translated into English, no doubt his pronouncements were considered provocative.[60]

General Tojo as the villain

As already stated, Sasakawa did not divulge to the prosecutors any specific facts that could disadvantage others among the accused nor did he offer them any ammunition of a real kind usable in court. The grand exception was his statement on General Tojo, Japan's actual war leader and the principal figure among the accused. Sasakawa stated that:

> "During the war Tojo's power and authority can probably be said to have surpassed that of the emperor."[61]
>
> "To describe him in one word, Tojo became a military man seeking his own personal success — he commenced hostilities and deployed the armed forces at his pleasure."[62]
>
> "The leaders who were preparing for war at the time were the military — Tojo."[63]

In other words he pointed at Tojo. Sasakawa had resigned himself to the idea that the general could not escape the death penalty. Tojo had to be made out as a villain in order to save the emperor.

Cash on the move?

In marked contrast to Sasakawa, Kodama made concrete statements. He named people and he specified events and actions with the possibility of placing other suspects at a disadvantage. Notably he gave testimonies voluntarily without waiting to be asked to do so by the prosecution.

Thereby in certain ways that we now know about, he collaborated with the prosecutors. For example, at an interrogation on 20 June 1947 Kodama made an offer of cooperation stating that he would like to convey "something extremely important" — something neither the defense nor the prosecution knew anything about. It had to do with the close collaborative relations between the Army and right-wing organizations in Japan, and it bore on the prewar economic aggression, going southward into Southeast Asia. He asked for "sufficient time to talk in detail about these matters."[64]

As a consequence, Kodama was duly interrogated by one William Edwards a month later on 21 and 23 July 1947. At these sessions, Kodama spoke up about the activities of Showa Trading Co. Ltd. (Showa Tsusho Kaisha), a company that the Imperial Army had established to procure the strategic raw materials necessary for war; and he gave details about the Banwa Agency (Banwa Kikan), an organization that the Imperial Navy set up for the same purpose. In particular regarding Showa Trading, with which he was directly involved, he explained how proceeds obtained from sales of heroin in China were used to purchase tungsten, and he gave the names of the people concerned. On top of that, he stated that all responsibility for these operations rested on the shoulders of a certain Muto Akira, director general of the Military Services Bureau of the Department of War. All Showa Trading's activities were conducted under him. Kodama further stated that he did not know much about Banwa Agency since he was not directly involved. But he told them that he believed Major General Tanaka Ryukichi was informed.

Furthermore, going into another matter, Kodama testified to US interrogator Edwards that Sasakawa had received 100,000 yen [a sum equivalent to $1.5 million today, calculated at 1 yen in 1940 as today's 1,618.19 yen], from the Army between 1941 and 1942. This testimony of Kodama's opened the way, as it happened, for a head-on confrontation between General Tanaka and Sasakawa, in front of the same prosecutor, with that same person hearing both parties. In fact, the ground had already been laid for this clash. Sometime earlier Tanaka Ryukichi had said that he "remembered another defendant named Sato Kenryo handing to Sasakawa a substantial sum of money around May 1942."

An angry denial

Sasakawa refuted this. He said that it was absolutely not the case, and he was very angry indeed, so he remembered:

> I had not vented as much fury during three years in Sugamo as I did against Tanaka Ryukichi's repugnant and unfounded

charge....

When Tanaka saw me in the interrogation room he began awkwardly, as might be expected, "Sasakawa san, I am extremely well disposed to you. This sort of matter will not disadvantage you.

"I do not wish you to have goodwill toward me. Whether it will be advantageous to me or not I will say what I have done and simply say I do not know if I don't know."

Prosecutor William Edwards turned to Tanaka and asked, pointing his finger at me: "You told me you saw a man receive money from Sato. Are you sure it is this man who received the money?" Tanaka very hesitantly mumbled: "If my memory is correct I think it was this person."

What a roundabout form of speech that was!

The prosecutor then turned to me and asked what I had to say to Tanaka.

"I do not even accept a cup of sake let alone money. I will immediately offer my life, if I have received as much as a cent. Tanaka, boastful as he is, would still probably not be able to bet his life on which of us is truthful and who is telling a lie. I swear by heaven and earth that Sasakawa Ryoichi is innocent."

As I spoke, Tanaka Ryukichi, powerfully built as he was, hung his head dwarfishly.

Prosecutor Edwards observed the scene in silence. He let me go, and, as he sent me away, he took my hand and held it, saying: "You are a gentleman."[65]

All about an airfield

There is a second record of this episode. It was made by the same William Edwards, the US prosecutor in the case, and recorded in an official English-language document. This runs as follows:

> Sasakawa told Edwards that he would "never embarrass him" by making a false testimony on his own account or anybody else's. To which Edwards responded that he was grateful for the guarantee, but that it seemed to him that "the case is going nowhere." Edwards proposed that the examination end there.[66]

Edward's allusion to Sasakawa being "a gentleman" must have referred to Sasakawa keeping his composure in spite of his rage against Tanaka.

The day after the confrontation Sasakawa wrote a letter to Edwards.

> Those who wish to take their grievances out on me may say I resort to use of force. I have not once hit anyone since I was born. I am confident the righteous person will always win so there is no such need at all. I state unequivocally that defense of justice requires nonresistance and readiness to risk one's life.
>
> Well, I enjoyed yesterday's confrontation and I thank you for it.... Until the truth is out I will not make any slanderous remarks about Tanaka. Indeed I will not take out my grievances on him. I pity Tanaka for acquiring a bad disease of unashamedly making slanderous charges.[67]

According to prosecutor Edwards, however, there was a further installment after the face-off. Major General Tanaka told him, so Edwards recorded, that he had "heard from one of the Japanese defense counsels" who had interviewed Kodama in Sugamo that Sasakawa had admitted to him that he had received 100,000 yen from defendant Sato Kenryo of the War Ministry.

Whereupon, to pursue the matter further, Edwards examined Kodama in the presence of Major General Tanaka. At that point Kodama, when questioned, acknowledged that he told the Japanese defense counsel that Sasakawa had told him that he had received 100,000 yen from the War Ministry, but he denied that Sasakawa had received that money from defendant Sato.

However, Kodama went on to say that, if the money had come from the War Ministry, then it had to have come from secret funds, and since Sato was the director general of the Military Services Bureau within the ministry at the time, any substantial payment could only have come from Sato. Kodama further stated that he thought that the money paid to Sasakawa was in return for his donation to the Imperial Airfield, (Teikoku Hikojo), his own private airfield on the outskirts of Osaka. Kodama then pointed out that the airfield was widely believed to have been a donation. So it was extremely wrong of Sasakawa to have received 100,000 yen, because that meant he was deceiving the public.[68]

Kodama vs. Sasakawa

The English-language document gives more or less the same account as the Japanese one. Kodama, on condition of secrecy, told the prosecution that he had heard that Sasakawa had said in answer to questions from the prosecutor that he had not received any money from the Army. So when he met Sasakawa later he asked him why he said such a thing...and he asked if Sasakawa had not received any money for the airfield he had donated to the Army. Kodama said that he understood that

Sasakawa maintained at first that he had donated the airfield, but had later received money from the Army.

Sasakawa, according to Kodama, said that the latter was right. Kodama then repeated this to defense counsel Kawauchi. He also added that the amount was 100,000 yen and was received either in 1941 or 1942 almost certainly in the office of the Military Services director general, in other words, Sato Kenryo.

Kodama went on to say that almost all the right-wing nationalist organizations went to General Tojo or to the Military Services Bureau of the Army, and received money.[69]

He added that he didn't know what relationship Sasakawa had with Sato, in ideological terms "relative to communism and nationalism." But he did know that Sasakawa had met those top figures in the military, such as Sato, Muto, and Tojo.[70]

Who told the truth?

It is impossible to be sure today which of the two, Kodama or Sasakawa, was telling the truth. Having said that, however, Kodama's statement about Sasakawa is at odds with what we know of the latter's movements both before and during the war. On grounds of common sense, and of chronology, Kodama's statements appear to be wrong.

Sasakawa had donated his private airport to the Army in 1934. If Sasakawa received the payment for it either in 1941 or 1942 it is clear, whatever the pretext, the Army would have been offering a bribe. But, as previously noted, Sasakawa was at odds with the authorities, and not in cahoots. He was a fierce, vocal, and open critic and opponent of the way the Imperial Rule Assistance body was used after the 1942 election, to solicit everybody who had been elected, forcibly, as members, regardless of whether they were government sponsored or not, and he was one of the very few members of the legislature who opposed, until the end, both the special law introducing the wartime penal code and the ad hoc control by the authorities of freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association.

On Sasakawa's own account, on notifying the government of his intention to make a critical statement in the parliament against the handling of the April 1942 IRAA election:

> Sato Kenryo came to see me.... He told me not to question the government on the issue. He said he had been sent by Tojo ...and told me to drop my own inquiry, and instead to ask questions along the lines that the Army had prepared. That would be good for both sides, he said. And, if Sasakawa complied, it would be written up in the Japanese newspapers.... Sasakawa

> had responded that was not right, saying: "I did not become a member of parliament to have my name appear in the papers." And he added: "The papers are controlled by the government. So they may not print a word of my own inquiry and that is all right by me.[71]

A thick envelope produced

This vignette illustrates how the heavy hitters of the Japanese military operated in wartime. This may be seen, precisely, in relation to the government's handling of criticism by Sasakawa on the wartime special penal law (Senji Keiji Tokubetsu Ho) and the ad hoc control law on freedom of speech, publication, assembly and association (Genron Shuppan Shukai Kesshya nado...Rinji Torishimari Ho). Initially more than one hundred parliamentarians opposed the highly repressive legislation, but only thirty or so remained after the government got through with its covert campaign of blackmailing and bribery. Sasakawa was the central figure campaigning against the government, according to what we know. The matter went all the way up to Prime Minister Tojo Hideki. Sasakawa received a message that Tojo wanted to see him, according to author Yamaoka. On presenting himself at the prime minister's official residence Sasakawa was ushered in to Tojo's office:

> Tojo began by saying: "It is about those bills...your formidable opposition has been a serious blow to the government. Unless I have them passed in a couple of days I will have to resign over it. So I have asked you over to hear what you have to say." Sasakawa offered a cryptic Zen-like response to which Tojo offered, "Thank you for your counsel. By the way, Hoshino [Naoki, chief cabinet secretary], is expecting you, so please drop in to see him." Sasakawa did as the prime minister suggested and stopped by at Hoshino's office. There, Hoshino offered Sasakawa a thick envelope saying, "Excuse me, Sasakawa san, this is not much but we have prepared this as it must be difficult for you to provide for such a large contingent of men...." By his account, Sasakawa's face changed color. He said: "Nothing of the sort!... I don't ever receive money from others. I give money. Though I say it myself I always have 500,000 or a million yen in my safe. Don't mistake me, I am not such an easy mark, you fool...." He stormed out of the room leaving behind a startled Hoshino.[72]

This was not quite an end to Kodama's squealing behind Sasakawa's back in prison. Kodama was not always entirely truthful in what he said about Sasakawa, claiming, for example, that Sasakawa told him that he "frequently fly to Europe before the war."[73]

This was not the case. [In fact, he made only one such visit, a matter that could easily be checked by the US prosecutors.]

Kodama, for his part, requested that his testimony regarding Sasakawa should be kept secret. What a contrast this made with Sasakawa's unvarying openness. Thus Sasakawa replied in the affirmative, when he was asked by the prosecutors, whether he was willing to testify in court regarding the conversation that took place that day. The prosecutors said that they could summon him to the court, if they chose, naturally, but they wanted to know whether Sasakawa was willing to bring up the subject discussed of his own accord.

"I shall act as I wish," he appears to have said. "It is my desire to go to the witness stand."[74]

Some collateral damage?

As it happens, Kodama's statement appears to have given the IPS prosecutor a bad impression of Sasakawa. Sasakawa was not told of Kodama's statement, as the prosecutor duly respected Kodama's request to keep his statement secret. There was, therefore, no face-off between Kodama and Sasakawa of the kind that took place between Sasakawa and Major General Tanaka Ryukichi.

On this issue the interrogator Edwards, after thoroughly studying the materials, concluded that Kodama's testimony had "an important meaning" in that it "broke the integrity of Sasakawa's claims" not to have received money from the military. However, Sasakawa repeatedly denied doing any such thing and had not changed his stance, even when confronted with Major General Tanaka, the prosecutors recalled in their records. And yet they concluded that "his secret confession to a Japanese lawyer friend that he received 100,000 yen appears to be a fact."[75]

Sasakawa, it seems, never learned of Kodama's disloyalty in Sugamo. But if he had known, he would no doubt have forgiven Kodama reasoning that he acted under extreme duress. Sasakawa, it will be seen, covered up for Kodama right to the end.

IV

It is open to question how many Japanese of his generation thought beyond their own shores, with memories of the defeat fresh in all minds, most of the big cities in ruins, and the population starving. Perhaps Sasakawa was right, being in prison had its merits. In any event he kept

up his one-man effort to think ahead. Not one to keep a low profile Sasakawa wrote frequent letters to General MacArthur at his headquarters in Tokyo and to President Harry Truman in Washington, D.C., urging them to consider Japan and its need for help, and to agree with him concerning the Soviet Union.

He expressed himself trenchantly on world politics in much of his, no doubt unanswered, one-way correspondence. For example, in a letter he addressed to President Truman dated 15 April 1946 Sasakawa began:

> In the future a major war will be fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the timing will be determined by the speed at which the reconstruction of the Soviet Union is completed and atomic bombs are made ready....
>
> There are but two choices before Japan and the Japanese, either to depend on a communist USSR or on a free United States. I am convinced that we would be happier with the United States. However, the ultimate choice will depend not so much on the Japanese but on the US Occupation policies. I state this frankly with the respect and affection due to a big brother and sister, because I long for Japanese citizens to enjoy continued happiness as good little brothers and sisters of the citizens of the United States of America.[76]

As to Japan, he asked for help on several fronts: food aid, since the population was starving; advice on how to grapple with a vicious inflation that was just taking hold of the shattered economy; a reduction in the levy on Japan introduced by the United States to cover the expenses of the Occupation army; and a fair war trial that should be so conducted as not to nurture anti-American feelings.

Be fair, be impartial

Japan was up against it in many ways, the nation's future was highly uncertain. However, Sasakawa focused his priority on what he thought was the biggest topic long term. This was the need for punishment of war crimes to be handled in a fair and impartial way, without discrimination as to whether those charged were from the winning or the losing side:

> Those who violate the rules of war must be strictly punished. The US Army has arrested and detained over a long period many men including those who have committed minor offenses such as slapping prisoners of war or who have nothing to do with the war. By contrast the United States has indiscriminately bombed

> Shinto shrines, Buddhist temples, and hospitals, and shot and killed noncombatant women and children.
>
> In an instant 78,000 lives were lost in Hiroshima where, with the exception of the nearby naval port of Kure, there were few military targets. Its choice as a target of nuclear attack is certainly the greatest violation of the rules of war. However, I have yet to hear of anyone responsible being punished. Application of the laws and norms of war must not depend on a country's wealth or lack of it or its victory or defeat.[77]

Sasakawa sent similar letters again on 30 June that year to President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson.[78] Prior to that he wrote to General MacArthur on 30 April 1946 as well as at the end of the previous year.[79]

It is highly doubtful that the letters addressed to Truman and MacArthur were delivered to them. The letters may not even have made it out of Sugamo. Sasakawa noted on 1 July 1946:

> This morning, Fukabori [a Class B and C war crimes suspect and a roommate of mine at the time] saw a guard open and read my letter to President Truman, which I had entrusted to the guards to drop in the mailbox at five p.m. yesterday. I promptly asked interpreter Sasaki to negotiate to have the letter dispatched expeditiously to the United States. It is inexcusable for that guard to open the letter. The guard who was on duty yesterday was also irresponsible. Some Americans do not keep their promises. How would the US military leadership react to this?[80]

The next day Sasakawa wrote:

> At three in the afternoon, the letter addressed to President Truman was returned to me with a tag attached saying to mail it through Dean Acheson, the US representative on the Council on Japan. I did as instructed and attached a cover letter to Mr. Acheson and entrusted it to the General's guard at five o'clock through Mr. Asano.[81]

It took courage to send these letters from Sugamo to the US president and to General MacArthur, the de facto ruler of Japan. From a third party perspective Sasakawa's letters were foolhardy and quixotic.

But he was incapable of sitting in his cell all day twiddling his thumbs. Looking back later, he remembered:

I was of course prepared for the worst having volunteered myself, and that helped me to do things fearlessly. I wrote boldly to President Truman and General MacArthur concerning Occupation policies. I also communicated freely and fearlessly with my friends and acquaintances outside. I hurled insults at the communists. As one who has a profound love of Japan I am convinced that the future of the country lies only in developing goodwill toward the United States.

For this reason I ardently wish for a strong solidarity between Japan and America, I want to promote cordial relations between our two countries as much as possible. In this regard I am convinced that I should be frank regarding the Occupation policies and say what I think are good and what are not. My ultimate love of Japan and the United States of America has made me call a spade a spade. Letter writing was the one means I had of taking action from the prison and I used this at every opportunity.

One person who bore most misgivings was the great "Mr. K." (most likely Kuzuo Yoshihisa [1847- ?], who participated in the establishment of Kokuryukai [Black Dragon Society] and served as its editor from 1937.) He asked Abe (believed to be former interior minister Abe Motosune) and Kodama to censor Sasakawa's letters before they were sent out. He feared they might have repercussions. No one took seriously that sort of silly talk. Abe and Kodama laughed it off.[82]

The abode of the blessed

The great enemy in jail is tedium. Sasakawa told jokes and tried in every way to encourage those around him who were depressed over their prospects. The guards opened all the cells at a fixed time of day to allow the inmates to visit and talk with each other. Sasakawa used this time to do what he referred to as "making the rounds." Later, he remembered, "Indeed I looked forward to sharing my philosophy of life especially with those who showed signs of moral and physical injury."[83]

Among all the prisoners, he knew best how to survive in jail, thanks to his three-year prewar detention. It was important for them not to despair and to find something to enable them to make light of their situation. Sasakawa thought up a play on Chinese characters by taking the two characters that denote "prison" and switching them into a pair using similar characters but with different meanings. Thus, prison (or "containment place," *kangoku*) became "comfortable place" *(gokuraku),* and then finally "paradise" *(gokuraku).* So, prison could after all become "the abode of the blessed."

His *Sugamo Diary* contains various reflections and memories of the three years he spent there after the war:

> If a rich man lives in a grand house but commits a crime he goes through hell. If one lives in prison but has done no harm it feels like paradise. Even a scholar cannot turn hell into paradise, but it is easy if one is without guilt to feel one is in paradise even living in hell. All it takes is a determination to make the most of things. (14 December 1945, pp. 35-36)

> An [American] guard came with interpreter Mr. Okada to check my towel. It seems there is a thief even in jail where thieves are locked up. I tell the guard that this is an abode of the blessed and there are no evildoers in paradise. The guard had a hearty laugh over this. I named my own cell the abode of "the blessed in Sugamo." (9 January 1946, pp. 66-67)

> It is already a month since I came here. Happy time flies in paradise, more like a bullet than an arrow." (12 January 1946, p. 71)

> The others all suffer because they want to get out of prison with only some minor offense. Despite all that they eat, they get thin and haggard. It is because they waste their spirits...if one has done no evil, no matter where one is, it is paradise and one's enemy can be one's friend.... If asked about my abode in Sugamo, I tell them it is a university of paradise on earth. (20 January 1946, p. 80)

> The other day a group of those who allegedly mistreated prisoners [Class C war crimes suspects] came over. Each in his different way asked me how I could be so cheerful. I told them it was because I didn't have a bad conscience. In contrast you have done things that make you ashamed and you are frantically looking for ways to escape punishment. No wonder you are gloomy. Accept that the time has come for you to pay for what you have done. That will put you out of your misery. (23 January 1946, p. 83)

> I am protected by the sacred spirits of the tens of millions of war dead and the spirit of my late father. That is why wherever I go gloom is dispelled and the place becomes a cheerful paradise. (18 February 1946, p. 104)

> Admiral Takahashi Sankichi told me, he found prison to be what I told him, the best university of life. Alas, he said, he was too late in enrolling in it. I said in my capacity as its president I would be presenting him with a diploma. The admiral laughed heartily and thanked me. (18 April 1946, p. 126)

> Pity me that I have not found ways of turning hell into paradise but fortunately I know to enjoy paradise while living in hell. So please have peace of mind with the thought that I am happy and hopeful here. (10 June 1946, a letter addressed to Atake Tsutomu, p. 302)

> No one in my room has ever been involved in a brawl. We live harmoniously. After dinner when I practice calligraphy my roommates take turns to read me an interesting novel. I practice my calligraphy and enjoy a novel at the same time. When I play cards with a roommate the other will sit by my side and cheer. In this way although I live in prison I have all the wonderful life of the innocent. It is paradise. (23 November, 1946, a letter addressed to Shizue, pp. 363-64)

Other inmates noted that Sasakawa made merry in Sugamo. Ishihara Hiroichiro, for example, wrote in his diary:

> Sasakawa has lived the life of a *ronin,* a master-less samurai of the feudal age and has an odd sort of vitality compared to others.[84]

> Sasakawa-san, the president of the PPP, is somewhat of an eccentric who came to the prison escorted by a brass band. He is exceedingly cheerful and keeps our room always merry.[85]

> Today (21 January 1948) during our exercise Sasakawa took his walk alone with a blanket over his back, humming a tune. I called out to him, "Hey, you are as high-spirited as usual!" "That goes for both of us!" returned he, with a grin. How he keeps up his jovial spirits!"[86]

By contrast, Kodama Yoshio seemed exhausted, for all that, like Sasakawa, he never took up a high government post and had experienced prison life before the war and was the youngest among the Class A inmates.

According to Ishihara, "He must worry about himself as he is often deep in thought and appears more tired than when he arrived, although he is still in his thirties and should be the most vigorous of us all."[87]

Kodama had this to say:

> When I was jailed as a political offender before the war there was an air of passion and enthusiasm as many of us were young, with political persuasions of left or right. Sugamo lacks that. Young men classified as Class C suspects are stunned by the irresponsible attitudes of their senior officers and have become cynical. Most of the Class A people are busy clinging on to what is left of their lives and have no hope for the future of the country. I would rather not see human weakness but there is not much choice in this communal setup.... Sasakawa with his strong spirits drives away the cheerless drudgery of our life.[88]

> As a Class A war criminal suspect I was sent to Sugamo where, I must say, I learned a great deal. There were of course wrongdoings and undesirable occurrences, but I would rather not talk about them because I hate to slander others. There were few who left an indelible impression on me for their dauntless attitudes. Among them was Kishi Nobusuke for whom I had an especially high regard. Many of the war criminals were restlessly devouring every piece of news printed in the daily papers wondering what their fates would be. Mr. Kishi was indifferent to the progress of the legal proceedings. "This is a political trial," he would say. "It is up to them whom they choose to hang. We will learn nothing from their arbitrary decisions." In contrast Mr. Sasakawa stood firm. "Go ahead and try us. I will tell them straight at the risk of my own life." Abe Mototsune kept his silence and was above it all. Matsui Ishine took the whole thing coolly. Only about six people among the sixty or so war criminals were great men.
>
> There we all wore the same prisoners' uniform and that's when one gets to know the true value of a person after all decorations and honors are stripped off.[89]

The gratitude of Admiral Takahashi

Admiral Takahashi Sankichi, who received a certificate from the "Sugamo Best University of Life," wrote how much he was encouraged by Sasakawa:

> For the first few days after being sent to prison I had no wish to do anything, not even to paint. An hour a day of outdoor exercise was the happiest time of the day when we could talk to each other. Conversation went like this: "I don't have any reason to be here"; "Communists must have given my name to the Occupation authorities"; and "When will we be permitted to leave?"
>
> One day Sasakawa stood behind me and gently touched my shoulder and said; "Well, you are also here Mr. Takahashi. I expect you to leave here soon. I have decided to stay three years." I asked him why and Sasakawa said, "I had spent three years in Osaka Prison earlier. After I left the prison I spent a day with the chief monk of the Tenryuji Zen temple in Kyoto, the Reverend Seki Seisetsu.* My own conclusion was that spending a year in Osaka Prison was equivalent to ten years of Zen training at the Tenryuji Temple. Destiny had led me to Sugamo Prison this time and I want to spend three more years here at what I call a university of life."
>
> These reflections of Sasakawa's made me ashamed. I decided to adopt Sasakawa's attitude and that brightened up my days. I owed my life in prison to him.[90]

> As told earlier, I learned a great deal from Sasakawa early on in my stay at the prison. Since then whenever I saw an unfamiliar face or a depressed-looking person during the exercise time we spent outdoors I walked with him and listened to his complaints. I then urged him in Sasakawa-style to consider the time spent in prison an immeasurable opportunity to train his mind and body in preparation for a big job later.
>
> Training in prison has easily twenty times the value of living outside.[91]

Sasakawa's diary records many words of gratitude expressed by inmates and roommates for the encouragement he gave them. For example, Sasakawa had promised his two young roommates, Class B and C war crime suspects, that he would do everything to acquit and get them out as soon as possible so that they could enjoy a happy family life and contribute to society. For his part he was not in a hurry to get out because he could not contribute directly to production increase. The two, somewhat bewildered, thanked him and said it was like meeting a "Buddha in hell." They had told Sasakawa that they had come from a cell where there was no laughter. They were truly merry after joining the happy room. I told them that my cell was the "Paradise of Sugamo," Sasakawa wrote.[92]

One day, one of his roommates was leaving the prison after he was found to have been wrongly detained due to mistaken identity. He wanted a graduation certificate and Sasakawa obligingly complied by writing on a ceremonial Japanese paper that he had graduated from the "Sugamo University" and signed it, "President Sasakawa Ryoichi." With the certificate in hand, the man said he would not complain for the wrong done to him. As the trial neared the men became thin and worn out. "But those in my room were cheerful and looked well fed to the envy of the others."[93]

Sense of humor

Sasakawa understood the inner workings and subtleties of human nature, and was kind to the younger men, especially the Class B and C suspects in his room. He was enormously popular with them. They enjoyed his dirty jokes and their laughter rang through the prison. Among his papers, he kept a number of *tanka* (Japanese poems of thirty-one syllables), Chinese verses, and personal letters. But his *Notes in Prison* (Gokuchu bobiroku) also included lists of dirty jokes. Sasakawa was a professional of a kind in prison service.

Not that all within Sugamo was sweetness and light. There were some grim moments. One time, a Class C suspect by the name of Yokoyama Kanzaburo was sent to Sasakawa's room. He suffered from a lung disease, ran a high fever in the afternoon, and occasionally brought up blood. After vomiting, Yokoyama would turn to Sasakawa and mumble to himself, "It is wrong to smoke, isn't it, *sensei*?" But he could not stop smoking. In Sasakawa's judgment the man would get off rather lightly as a Class C suspect, but he wished the young man would stop smoking for his own sake. Sasakawa proposed that he would keep him company and refrain from smoking if Yokoyama would do the same.

> "Yokoyama, you really should stop smoking!"
>
> "Yes I know, I keep telling myself that, but it's really difficult, especially with you puffing away, *sensei.* I absolutely cannot stop."
>
> "Hmm, it may be cruel to tell a nicotine addict to stop smoking, but it can hardly be compared to losing your life. If you say it is harder for you to stop because your cell-mate keeps smoking, all right, I'll have to stop smoking too."
>
> "Let's try it out for three weeks."
>
> Yokoyama and I began a three-week no-smoking campaign. Naturally, it was painful for me as well. At times I wanted to smoke badly, especially after a meal. I missed the indescribable

> comfort of the smoke and I felt sorry for making such a rash promise. It appeared that Yokoyama was having an even harder time than I.
>
> In a matter of days he became listless. He stared into space and stopped talking. During our outdoor exercise I saw him join another prisoner who was smoking so that he could sniff his exhaled smoke. He obviously craved the drug. I had to control my urge to tell him, "Go ahead. Let's give up!" I was more concerned for his health than anything else. On the fourth or fifth day he cried: "I'd rather die than not smoke."
>
> Outside prison there are things one can do to ease the urge to smoke, such as chewing gum or candy. Even work can help one forget. It is much harder in prison because there is nothing to distract one. I had to admit I was asking too much of him. I simply did not have the heart to insist any more. Our oath to abstain for three weeks lasted less than a week. Yokoyama broke his promise, but I kept it up to the end.[94]

Without other diversions, it was hard to stop smoking to help a young man suffering from tuberculosis. Sasakawa remembered that some of the Class C and B suspects would come and bid him good-bye when they left the prison. They would ask him to write a few lines in memory of their time together. After the defeat the calligraphy of the ministers and generals was worth little, they told him.[95]

Well liked and respected by the young Class B and C suspects, he was often asked by them to write a line with brush and ink, which he never failed to do, attesting that "So-and-so has completed the course at the University with honors," and signed it "Sasakawa Ryoichi, president of Sugamo Best University of Life." They loved this and thought it their best memento.[96]

Another incident may be cited showing Sasakawa's considerateness. It was January 1946 and the inmates were being treated to a ration of *mikan* (tangerines) as a luxury. Realizing that there were not enough to go round for everyone Sasakawa declined his due.

> I declined to take one for myself. If it was put in my hand then I would be obliged to accept it. Otherwise I think the young people should have it. It is only decent to be considerate of the young and respectful of the elderly.[97]

Those were times when provisions were short and "even bigwigs begged for more soup and rice in their bowls." Sasakawa was a rarity and his young roommates were duly impressed.[98]

V

Sasakawa distinguished himself from other Class A detainees by taking on unenviable chores. He noted:

> I did two things in the jail. One was to play devil's advocate and the other was to take on jobs others were loath to do.[99]

What did he mean?

> Compared with other Class A residents in Sugamo I am a nonentity with so little to offer. My only claim to seniority is the experience I have of serving time in jail.... Under the circumstances, I will not only be doing myself dishonor but, if I may say so, I will risk lowering the general morale if I complain of our treatment here. I appointed myself "president" of the "Sugamo Best University of Life" and decided to live up to the responsibilities that came with the role. I volunteered, therefore, for the thankless task of playing the bad boy.[100]

In practice this meant bringing grievances to the attention of the US soldiers who had the ungrateful task of serving inside the prison as guards. This was no light undertaking because for an inmate to complain was a risky affair, particularly when he did it for the benefit of the whole group. A worldly wise person would most certainly avoid drawing attention to himself. Sasakawa observed that there were few men of such spirit among the detainees. He noted that both "young and old tried to cut a deal at the expense of the others."[101]

Inevitably there were awkward incidents from time to time. One day an American warder singled out Tojo Hideki, the former prime minister, for the arduous task of cleaning the prison passageway before breakfast. Kodama Yoshio, according to his own account, challenged the warder, saying that it was not proper that an ex-prime minister should be forced to do such a menial job. According to Kodama, the warder, who was a captain, asked him why it was always the same two, he and Sasakawa, who complained about the treatment in prison when there were other Class A prisoners who spoke English.[102]

This episode brings to mind the popular belief that Kodama and Sasakawa acted like twins within the prison, and were forever challenging the American guards and getting into mischief. Yet as far as I know, the inmates regarded the two men quite differently. Kodama did not enjoy their praise for his courage and self-sacrifice in the way Sasakawa did.

Some of his friends outside the prison walls advised Sasakawa to take it easy. There was no telling, they said, what the Soviets and the Americans might do to him. Sasakawa noted:

> I am grateful for their warm friendship, but I care nothing for my own life or death. All I care about is to defend justice and righteousness and discourage evil, and save our people and my country and ultimately mankind. Heaven has assigned me this great mission and I do not intend to back off, even for the friendly admonitions I receive. Let them cut me down if they must. Kill me if they must. I shall only rejoice for being able to serve my fellow human beings. I have nothing to fear, for with me are the war dead in their millions and the two billion who are living on the planet.[103]

To be sure, there were many problems that cropped up in the course of daily life in the prison. There was a terrible scarcity of food outside and the shortage impacted on the prison all the time. Food was not fairly distributed and some grumbled. The detainees decided to submit a complaint to the warden. Immediately, some beat a retreat. Lieutenant General Wachi Tsunezo and Colonel Hirano refused to put their names to a joint letter. Instead they pushed a younger man to append his name. Sasakawa was irate at their cowardice and he raised his voice against them. "Those who shirk responsibility do not deserve to eat."[104]

The contentious issue drew in some of the most dignified detainees such as Admiral Takahashi Sankichi. He went so far as to ask Sasakawa to stop hungry young Class B and C detainees from begging for leftover food. At that time Sasakawa was not close to the admiral and, to judge from his diary, could scarcely contain his disgust.

> Here is an old man nearing seventy who flatters the guard and receives more rations than the young men, but refuses to attach his name to a general request they had written asking for an increase in rations. He wants the young men to do the hard work while he reaps the reward. Japan was beaten because of corrupt and sly officers like him.

Sasakawa continued:

> I was told that even Admiral Shimada Shigetaro asked people in the cells on our side of the passageway not to request more food because he feared that the rations on his side might be cut. Our younger men muttered that the admiral was a selfish beast. He should really be asking for increased rations on behalf of the

younger men regardless of which side of the passageway they had their cells.

We lost the war, they said, because we had a man like him as minister of the Navy. The admiral should have committed harakiri to take responsibility for the defeat but instead he lived on in disgrace. He had no intention of making any self-sacrifice. He just wanted to play it safe and get out of here.[105]

That was not all. Sasakawa heard that Dr. Okawa Shumei and General Matsui Ishine had handed to the guard a letter addressed to the chief warder complaining, without any evidence, that "some people on the other side of the corridor are stealing our food." Sasakawa's reaction was to decry their meanness of spirit, but he also criticized them for poor tactics:

> They are bad negotiators. They should have just said we should get as much food as the other side. But to complain that the others stole their food was bad tactics.... Really clumsy! Quarreling should be one's last resort.[106]

In Sasakawa's eyes Class A inmates were crude and unskillful in handling their affairs — in everything from building their strategies in court to demanding better treatment in jail. Not that he despaired. Reality, however daunting, only strengthened him.

As we have seen, he was not averse to going to the top. Sasakawa wrote critically a number of times to President Truman and to General MacArthur urging that the Tokyo trial be conducted with greater fairness. This was risky. Indeed, if he wanted to save his skin he should not, in the first place, have acted as he did to make sure that he would be detained as a Class A war criminal suspect. Sasakawa had taken it on himself to speak for the other inmates and they counted on him.[107]

A ringing declaration

When the US prosecutors questioned Sasakawa for a third time on 21 December 1945 he had a statement ready to make to the Occupation authorities based upon what he had heard at the previous two interrogations. He had kept a record of this detailed written declaration, as recorded in *Sugamo Diary:*

> I love America. My wish is to see world peace established and to save humankind forever from the scourges of war. To this end the Japanese must become true peace lovers. You have my cooperation to achieve this objective. Allow me, though, to speak my

mind frankly.

First, members of parliament should not be detained when parliament is in session, even in the present exceptional circumstances, without special authorization by the emperor. I expect the United States to have greater regard for the elected representatives of the people. On what legal grounds did the United States, with its avowed respect for the individual, arrest me, a member of parliament, without even an indictment? Why did America not postpone my detention, as a politician representing his constituency, until the session was over? I am sad for the United States.

He continued:

Second, now is the time to stop personal attacks based on lies, such as the accusation brought against General Tojo Hideki of accepting a gift of 10 million yen. These irresponsible accusations will only make the Japanese people lose trust in America.

Here, Sasakawa made reference to an allegation by the Allied Powers — later withdrawn — that the Mitsui *zaibatsu* made a donation of that amount to Prime Minister Tojo during the war.

Third, it is said that the Occupation censorship [of the press] is worse now than at any time under the Tojo government. The United States stands for freedom and equality and must be consistent in what it says and what it does, and not restrict freedom just because we are a defeated nation.

Fourth, what do you say to giving the Japanese government a free hand in conducting its affairs, without your direct orders?

Fifth, the greatest concern of the Japanese people is how the war criminals will be punished. Some say the United States will conduct a fair trial, because it has respect for the individual, while others fear that the trial will be only a formality, doing away with witnesses and stenographic records and merely punishing those who displease America. Since the outcome of the trial will have a grave impact on the establishment of peace and our trust in the United States, it must: (a) call witnesses, (b) have stenographic records taken of the statements of defendants and properly translated to ensure correct understanding, (c) not enact new laws with the purpose of punishing the defeated, (d) restore the honor of those acquitted so as not to leave behind bitter feelings, and (e) if the United States is serious about build-

ing goodwill between our two countries, then remove those who curry the favor of the Occupation headquarters, and listen to the frank opinions of the acquitted about the future of our two countries and the world.

Today, Japanese who truly love peace are not frequent visitors to the Occupation headquarters. If I were in the position of the United States I would have the neutral powers, and not the victors, conduct the trial. Were that done, people everywhere would assume the trial to be fair, even if it were not. If the victor tries the vanquished it will be seen as unreasonable even if it is fair — or regarded as such here because of the loser's inferiority complex. If the loser believes the trial was unreasonable there will be bitterness.

Where there is bitterness there is no true or lasting peace. I say this out of my love for Japan and America. I beg you to convey this statement of mine to General MacArthur for his active consideration, the matters I state being so important."[108]

There is no doubt that these remarks by Sasakawa were duly received by the Occupation as recorded in his *Sugamo Diary.* A document no. 2048, dated 5 January 1946 and attributed to the US Army Counter Intelligence Pacific Region Chief Office, is found in Volume 24 of the Minutes of the IPS. This same document is the English translation of the statement Sasakawa had submitted, and its outline is not different from the entry in *Sugamo Diary,* quoted above.

Not that the two records are identical in every respect. In fact, Sasakawa omitted reference to what would have been for him an absolutely key part of his statement. He made remarks, it is apparent from document #2048, on the subject of the imperial system. His comments on this subject do not feature in the relevant part of *Sugamo Diary* at all. The crucial part of document #2048 states as follows:

> The Japanese people are relieved that the Allied powers have acknowledged the need for the continuation of the imperial system. There is a rumor, however, that some in the US Occupation authority hope to destroy our imperial system with the support of the communists. If the imperial system is to be changed then it should be left up to the Japanese people to consider how. Leftist parties, particularly the Communist Party, must not be openly used to destroy the imperial system.[109]

All of the above passage is missing from *Sugamo Diary.* On the other hand, the English language text #2048 does not record items 5-a

to 5-d that Sasakawa says in a diary that he had stated before the prosecutors. Furthermore, the text of #2048 is much shorter. However, the brevity of the IPS text may be accounted for by compression in the translation.

In conclusion, we can safely assume that the two documents, if not identical, constitute a full record when put together.

Keeping the Chrysanthemum Throne

There is a puzzle, a conundrum. Why did Sasakawa leave out of *Sugamo Diary* any reference to the imperial system and the possibility of reforming it? Did he hesitate in writing of this matter even in his diary? Or was it his intention to put the main emphasis on saying that it should be up to the Japanese people to decide how the imperial system would be changed? He may have intended his remark that "it is all right to change the imperial system" to be heard as a rhetorical flourish leading to the main message — and then the IPS gave it prominence beyond what he had in mind. Whatever the truth of the matter as regards this record, from Sasakawa's point of view the imperial system would not change drastically come what may, as long as the issue was left up to the Japanese, since the great majority of them were in favor of maintaining it unchanged.

Spirits of the dead calling

Back in Sugamo, meanwhile, Sasakawa occupied himself once more with good-housekeeping issues. He had negotiated successfully with the head of the jail to take on the cleaning and other chores from the elderly detainees, because he was indignant that they had been assigned as much work as the younger inmates.

> The chores, including cleaning the baths, passageways, and washbasins, were all right. I could handle this."[110] In Japanese jails, detainees under trial do not have to labor, unless they volunteer. Here we are worked fully. On the thirtieth, I cleaned the large concrete passageway with soap barefoot, and on the thirty-first I was ordered to scrub the communal bath. I worked hard at it until I had many blisters on my hands.
>
> Not that he complained to his jailors:
>
> While I am hard at work it is paradise. It makes me forget how cold the water is.[111]

> I cleaned even round the gallows, a task that everyone particularly disliked. At such times I happily told myself that the spirits of the dead were calling out to me, and so I worked even harder until the scaffold was clean.[112]

Four cigarettes a day

In truth, these were arduous labors. Soon after entering Sugamo Prison, Sasakawa wrote an open letter dated 18 December 1945, addressed to "My dear friends." In it he stated:

> Life in Sugamo is not as comfortable as some newspaper articles have claimed. Taking the plus side, we receive a daily ration of four cigarettes, which we are free to smoke in our cells. This is the only thing that is better than in a normal Japanese jail. The rest is worse than the pain that I experienced in Osaka when I was imprisoned there ten years ago.
>
> This discrepancy — between what we experience and what the newspapers have reported — is due to irresponsible reporters who choose to paint our life here as if we are treated as honored guests leading a pampered existence. I beg you not to tell lies, because it is the warders and we inmates who suffer when false reports are made about us.[113]

There was, of course, no heating in the cells. Sasakawa recalled this aspect of the prisoners' lives in *Expressions of Sugamo*. There, he noted that:

> It is bad enough to have to fight the cold, but that is not the whole story. We are forced to work on the coldest winter days. On mornings when the ground is covered with snow or frost, we are up at five when it is still dark and while our parsimonious sun goddess is still asleep. We finish breakfast by six.
>
> Then the cleaning of the passageway begins. With soap and a scrubbing brush we scrub away in the passageway, barefoot. The moment I enter, stinging cold creeps up my limbs. My fingers are red and numb. In this state the cold hurts. It is like being pierced by needles.... It is easy to imagine the pain that senior bureaucrats and businessmen must suffer as they are put to work in their old age. These are men who lived most of their lives protected from the heat of summer and the cold of winter, living in the comfort of their villas. I begged the authorities here to spare them this hard labor and I was successful in that regard.

> I was greatly relieved. I set aside the pain, even as I glimpsed Kuzuo Nobuhisa of the Black Dragon Society, now in his seventies, sitting in his cell quietly reading some papers while being spared our chores.[114]

This same Kuzuo, it may be noted, was most probably the grand old "Mr. K" mentioned earlier as having expressed concern that Sasakawa's letters to President Truman and General MacArthur could make the inmates' position worse. Sasakawa had harsh words for the old man, given his cowardly attitude, but his natural inclination was to be sympathetic.

Trying to be a good boy

Sasakawa, no doubt, stood out a mile among the detainees by his boldness and openness. He was popular among the American guards as well as among the Japanese. Sasakawa insisted that his frank remarks stemmed from his love of both Japan and America and such comments did not fall on deaf ears. In fact, the American prosecutors and the jail authorities listened to what he had to say about the US Army in Japan, both by way of passing on remarks made to him by the general public before he entered prison and by commenting on what he read in the newspapers once in jail. It must be their own open attitude, Sasakawa noted about Americans, that made their country what it is.[115]

He recorded that:

> I was blunt with the jail authorities as well as the guards in giving them a piece of my mind. Cheerful by nature, as they are, the Americans who got to know me became a most friendly group. Even an army surgeon who had little contact with me came by my cell just to say hello on one of his visits he made nearby.
>
> Trying hard to be a good boy does not get you anywhere. If one is absolutely free of selfish motives and wishes only good for others, then love prevails in the end no matter how much they may dislike you at first.[116]

That did not mean that everyone in authority in the jail was favorably disposed to Sasakawa. There was still some deep sense of hostility and ill feeling among Americans toward the Japanese due in part to the wartime anti-Japanese propaganda. In addition, there was naturally a sense of superiority on the winning side, looking down on the loser:

> Americans use us for unproductive purposes, as if they would incur loss if they did not use us. They tell us to scrub clean with

> wire brushes the dirty white paint on the concrete. Of course, the more one scrubs the worse it looks because the dark concrete is exposed. I therefore asked through interpreter Asano whether they wanted us to remove the soiled paint in order to apply fresh paint later. Apparently not. I told the overseer that scrubbing was useless because it only exposed the concrete underneath. They want us to keep scrubbing. I don't understand.
>
> On this basis they have no right to bring up complaints about the Japanese Army exploiting their prisoners of war.[117]

The work was hard for Sasakawa, whose injury to his right arm when young had permanently impaired him, though he very rarely refers to this in his record of Sugamo:

> In the course of the morning they made me scrub with a brush and soap for two hours without a break some 2,600 square feet of concrete passageway, even though my right arm is crippled. In the afternoon they made me clean cobwebs high above the passageway. This is cruelty. If the Japanese treated Americans in this way during the war they would have been condemned to death by the war crimes trial.[118]

These were the sort of things that went on openly inside Sugamo Prison.

Warder Kurosaki

Worse was to come. A second-generation Japanese American called Kurosaki (or Kurisaki, see note 119) served as a chief warder at Sugamo from late 1945. Reports conflict as to his rank. It would appear according to *Sugamo Diary* that on his arrival he held the rank of second lieutenant and was later promoted to first lieutenant. What is not in doubt is that he had enough authority to make himself extremely unpleasant toward the detainees if he so chose. In time, something triggered a flood of aggression in him toward the prisoners, especially Sasakawa. "After the second lieutenant arrived, to our dismay, we were all treated with insults and cruelty," Sasakawa said.[119]

Everyone took note of the untoward development:

> The chief warder from late 1945 was a stout Japanese American First Lieutenant who went by the name of Kurisaki. During his one-year tenure he never smiled and he treated us Japanese as if he nursed a strong antipathy toward us. One day in October 1946 we were all told that we could keep only a limited amount of belongings with us.

> The next day (Kurisaki) came around with a few guards and threw our personal things out into the passageway. He then stripped us naked and conducted a physical examination. He did this with obvious hatred, which staggered even his subordinates.
>
> Without exception, all of us felt indignation. His method of handling us became a routine so that we spent a most unpleasant time for four or five months.[120]

These circumstances were rare but not unheard of. Such a show of hatred toward people of one's own ancestry, while not unusual, crops up among second-generation nonwhites in America, who try to surpass others and to be more American than the Americans. Such aggressive behavior indicates insecurity about one's own identity and it may stem from discrimination suffered by nonwhites. The manifestation of ill will by the second-generation Japanese American guard may well have been the flip side of his self hate, which he then took out on his own kind. In fact, during the Pacific War many Japanese Americans were sent off to detention camps for the duration of the war, even with no time allowed them to gather up their belongings. Many suffered enormous hardships. At the same time, second-generation Japanese Americans in the camps were drafted to fight in the US Army. Some of them, not unsurprisingly, had extremely strong anti-Japanese feelings.

One theory within the prison, according to Ishihara, was that "Lieutenant Kurosaki" was not Japanese at all but of Korean ancestry.[121] If true, this would or could raise another complete set of cultural generalizations and possible oversimplifications. After Japan's defeat in 1945, when Korea regained its independence after thirty-five years of colonization, some Koreans living in Japan were deeply hostile, having suffered from discrimination in what they regarded as their own country. The rumor that Kurosaki was Korean may itself have arisen partly from prejudice — a sense on the part of the detainees at Sugamo that the only way to explain their jailer's extraordinary hostility toward Japan was that he was after all Korean. However, if as rumored Lieutenant Kurosaki was a second-generation Korean American it would have been highly unlikely for him to have used a Japanese name after Japan's defeat.

"Those eyes!"

Be that as it may, the junior officer in question took a dislike to Sasakawa, a war criminal suspect who stood up to the US authorities in asserting Japan's position with grace and composure. One day Lieutenant Kurosaki learned that Sasakawa had written a letter to the prison director criticizing his (Kurosaki's) attitudes and requesting that letters

addressed to the director not be opened "as other detainees failed to come forward to complain for fear of retaliation."[122]

A very nasty situation arose. Lieutenant Kurosaki proceeded to take out his wrath on Sasakawa:

> 12 October 1946: I found Lieutenant Kurosaki standing in front of my cell and greeted him politely, whereupon the lieutenant pulled me roughly by the collar and punched me in the chest, removed my *geta* [wooden clogs], pulled me to the *tatami* mats, struck me again with his fist, and made me to sit on my heels.
>
> Then Kurosaki ordered me to stand up, and when I did so he punched me three more times in the chest and once to the jaw. I did not know what was happening, so I told him that I did not understand English. He showed me a note I had given to the guard. I admitted it was my writing. He asked if I was a serviceman and I said no.
>
> I asked for Mr. Sasaki, an interpreter. He told me what the lieutenant was saying. "Don't stare at me with those eyes," was the gist of it. "Or would I like to be struck again?" I had little choice. I told him to strike me as much as he pleased.
>
> My jaw did not hurt much but my chest did.[123]

On 13 October, the following day, the violence was resumed.

> Everyone took note of the incident and expected that I would receive an apology befitting the United States. It never came. Instead, after the daily walk ended at 9:30, I was told to clean 900 square feet of passageway alone as a disciplinary measure....
>
> I developed blisters on my hands and perspired. It must have surprised Kurosaki that I did as I was told in spite of the pain in my chest. After lunch I was ordered to wash the stairs between the first and second floors.[124]

On 14 October Sasakawa noted cryptically in his diary, "Lieutenant Kurosaki is as persistent as a serpent."

On 15 October Sasakawa was threatened again. His diary entry reads: "Where does the fatty's [Lieutenant Kurosaki's] cruelty and world-class cold-bloodedness come from?"

The next day, 16 October, Sasakawa wrote, "He said he would give me the toughest chore of all, scrubbing the wall. I worked an hour and forty-five minutes right up to 4:15 p.m."

On 17 October matters were no better:

> After breakfast I was singled out again. It was work for cruelty's sake.... I was forced to labor again from 9:35 a.m. I expected him to let me off when I had completed the job, so I worked until I was worn out. But he kept me at it without rest until 11:45 a.m.

Lieutenant Kurosaki continued to press the next day:

> Today...I cleaned the windows for two hours and forty minutes, from 1:35 to 4:15 p.m. The guard kept checking and I had not a minute of rest."

The forced labor routine continued for twelve days until 24 October 1946. On the previous day Sasakawa had written: "My hardships are many times worse than the humiliation suffered by the Han Chinese general Kwan-shin (died 196 B.C.E.), who was forced to crawl between the legs of his captors."

Sasakawa lost his appetite and suffered headaches and chest pains. By 16 October, halfway through the beatings, he had lost so much weight that he "could now easily do up my pants' buttons."

An eyewitness summed up Sasakawa's ordeal in these terms:

> Sasakawa Ryoichi was punched by Kurisaki for one reason or another during our work periods. Although he suffered pains in his chest for the next two weeks Sasakawa was not seen by a doctor, and the warder insisted on cruelly putting this sick person to work, day after day.[125]

"No use brooding...."

Forever patient, self-confident, and above all optimistic, Sasakawa did not lose heart over this episode. Kurosaki, he noted, took the opportunity "to test the extent of my physical endurance." He added: "The cruelty and insults heaped on me helped me to cultivate my virtues." Moreover, Sasakawa had the assets of humor to match the situation. "If I were asked to be a back-scrubber in a public bath, I would resolve to be the best scrubber in the world."[126]

On 26 October, two days after the last of his beatings, he wrote the following:

> I won the battle by returning virtue for Mr. Fatty's violence. I wonder if there is something wrong with my chest. It would shame him if due to his violence I am hospitalized and the incident becomes public and he is punished. He has just been pro-

> moted. I must try hard to get well. Of course, the incident must be brought to the attention of the US Army but I want to do this without having him punished. Mr. Fatty, who is the ultimate in cruelty, would probably not understand my feeling.
>
> This is a great opportunity to help America improve its ways, regain the trust of the Japanese and promote Japan-US goodwill.[127]

No matter how brutally the warder behaved Sasakawa had the big-heartedness not only to forgive, but to put himself in the other's shoes, while keeping his commitment to nonviolence and non-appeasement. Class A war criminal suspect Sasakawa had won a complete spiritual victory over Lieutenant Kurosaki, who had behaved so abominably using the authority of the victor nation.

On 28 October 1946 Sasakawa wrote to Shizue, his wife:

> It is no use brooding over things one cannot help.... One must return violence with virtue. It is not worth burning oneself up inside with thoughts of vengeance. One suffers for it, and even if one were to get one's revenge one day, all it would only start a vendetta. There would never be total victory or defeat. It would all be so meaningless. If only one side exercises patience, we will be saved from the pain of a vendetta.
>
> Exercising patience does not mean defeat. Formally I may have lost, but spiritually it has been a total victory. To cope with this, one should be unconcerned with the praise or criticism of others, and stay the course against the ill wind of slander. Let the enemy realize the uselessness of ill will, and be discouraged from further mischief. Without this firm determination, one would forever be an easy target of unpleasantness and contempt.[128]

This was a precious piece of advice, coming from one who had survived the physical abuse and who followed the biblical injunction, "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you." (Matt. 5:44).

Events moved swiftly thereafter. At the end of 1946 Lieutenant Kurosaki was transferred from Sugamo and put in charge of catering. Four months later he was court-martialed for some wrongdoing and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He was given an additional seven months for injuring Sasakawa.[129]

According to Kodama Yoshio, there was a little known background to these events: "Kurisaki had kept a woman by secretly appropriating a great portion of the food intended for the detainees in Sugamo and removing it in a US Army truck for sale on the black market.[130]

This may explain why the food at the jail had rapidly deteriorated after Lieutenant Kurosaki became head warder in 1946.

VI

Sasakawa, we have seen, was very different from the other inmates in Sugamo. Unlike the bulk of the Class A suspects he felt an ongoing responsibility for the state of the nation. Feeding the people came first. Ordinary Japanese were acutely short of food in the aftermath of the war and right up to the end of the Occupation in 1952. There were many other issues to contend with. Inflation was rampant and the economy needed an expert hand to guide it back to the path of stable growth — but the lack of food was the most vital problem.

Troubles did not come singly. Sasakawa was concerned about the safety of millions of compatriots still in foreign lands. We have seen how with the courage of a Don Quixote he had written to President Truman and General MacArthur imploring them to provide food assistance and to curtail the inflation. He also communicated with Japanese leaders. On 3 June 1946 Sasakawa wrote to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, with whom he probably was not personally acquainted: "In order to build a new Japan, economic breakdown must be prevented and our 75 million brothers must be saved both from rampant inflation and death from starvation."[131]

On 17 December 1945 Sasakawa noted:

> Awake or asleep, my mind is preoccupied with the Communist Party problem, the general starvation and the safety of our compatriots scattered abroad. Victorious Americans, please, just think of our situation. Loving your family and your relatives as you do, please consider that we are all the same. Will you not make our families happy by bringing home their loved ones on your ships? At the moment, the rice we purchase cannot be transported because there are no ships. Will you not put yourself in our shoes and send us rice?
>
> The best way to make the Japanese true peace-lovers is not by taking our arms away. Rather it is to be a doctor who cares for his patients, setting aside the fact that we were your enemies. I would gladly give my life if I could save our helpless and pitiable fellow countrymen. Dear Americans, think what you would feel, if you were the defeated people. Believe me, our resentment at having had our homes burned and our brothers killed will instantly dissolve if you act with compassion. We will forever re-

> spect the United States of America as our big brother and will not forget our gratitude.[132]

Sasakawa chiefly feared expansion within Japan of communists and their sympathizers. This was for a number of reasons, among them his strong resentment of the inhuman regime of the Soviet Union, the home of communism, and its policy of external aggression. He opposed Marxism, and of course the avowed aim of Japanese communists to end the monarchy in Japan.

Above all, he believed that the food policy of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) was obstructing food aid from America:

> It is futile for the JCP to mobilize people to mount a food demonstration outside the Imperial Palace [in Tokyo]. There is no rice to be had, and the demonstration will only make people hungrier. Such action is contrary to what the party purports to stand for. Its groundless propaganda and its claim that the JCP has unearthed hidden food supplies make them feel good and self-righteous.
>
> Are they themselves living only on meager official rations by any chance, and not buying on the black market? It is easy for them to point a finger at others while deceiving us claiming that they are the only true saviors. A plague on them! They are sabotaging General MacArthur's goodwill offer to import rice by alleging that somewhere there is 3.42 million tons of rice hidden away. This cruel deceit is driving the Japanese people to starvation. How can the JCP claim to be compassionate? The party talks of humanity and justice but it behaves like a wild animal.[133]

Praying for the rice harvest

Sasakawa was furious with the communists. They were playing dice with the lives of the people they purported to represent. He was a country boy. Thoughts of the harvest began to fill his mind. A good harvest that year would help. He was well informed, based on what his constituents told him of the desperate lives they led. His strongest critics acknowledged Sasakawa's qualities. For example, Royama Masamichi, a professor turned journalist, while having denounced Sasakawa to the US Counter Intelligence Corps, also noted:

> Sasakawa is a talented and eloquent orator and is extremely good at winning the hearts and minds of the destitute and lower-class people. He is particularly popular among blue-collar workers with little education.[134]

Sasakawa's diary for 1946 frequently mentions the weather in relation to prospects for the rice harvest:

> The weather these days makes me worry that there will be a poor harvest. (8 May)
>
> The wheat needs sun round this time of the year. But it is fine one minute and cloudy the next. Weather like this spells a bad harvest. (14 May)
>
> Got up at 5 a.m. and prayed for better weather and a bumper crop for the sake of the victims of the war. (15 May)
>
> It makes me happy to have this long-awaited spell of good weather. Prayed today for a rich harvest. (29 May)

At the height of summer, he continued to make notes on the weather:

> This fine weather and the heat should be good for the rice harvest. For the rice cool evenings are the best thing to hope for. I say it is worthwhile to pray. (14 July)
>
> It is good weather, and if we have this heat for some more days it will be good for the rice harvest. If I should die in this steamy heat the rice will do well. (15 July)
>
> I waited for the typhoon thinking that it could feed the rice, but it never came. (19 August)
>
> Am still waiting for the typhoon but it never comes. (20 August)

By 10 September 1946 his spirits had risen:

> It is the 220th day of the lunar year, which is normally the peak of the typhoon season, but thank goodness there is only token rain. It will be a good harvest. I thank heaven and earth.

After all his anxiety about the weather it was only natural that Sasakawa was beside himself with joy when he came across a newspaper article forecasting a bumper crop in 1946.[135]

Give peace a chance

At the same time that he was beset with these home country concerns, Sasakawa was worried about the international situation. He had been

concerned from prewar days for the whole world, and not just for the Japanese people. Before the war he believed that if necessary Japan should use military force to undermine Western colonial domination of Asia and thereby bring about the liberation and independence of non-white peoples in the region. After the total defeat of Japan in World War Two his thinking underwent a complete change. He dreamed of renouncing the world's arms to save humankind forever from the scourges of war. There was a clear link, as noted earlier, between the prewar slogan "Hakko Ichi'u" (Eight Corners of the World under One Roof) and the postwar ideal of "the world is one family." Sasakawa wrote soon after he entered jail: "In defeat we have the important obligation and responsibility to exert our best efforts to establish peace."[136]

Particularly noteworthy is the development of his thought soon after his detention commenced. He wrote that "the peoples of the world are all brothers [and sisters]." He launched an appeal, even from jail as he noted in *Sugamo Diary* (p. 104), to "start a movement right here in Sugamo for the salvation of humankind and to save our brothers [and sisters] all over the world." It was certainly ambitious, if not ridiculous, for a detainee — a Class A war criminal suspect, no less — to dream of starting a new peace movement from within the four walls of a prison cell. Others were certainly not in the mood for it.

Yes, it may have seemed absurd to others at the time, but Sasakawa was in earnest. He shared his thoughts in an open letter that began "My Dear Friends," dated 25 December 1945:

> The leadership that will save our people eternally from the scourge of war and enable them to live free and happy lives as true peace-loving people will not come from those opportunistic bystanders, but from those who will be acquitted after enduring hardships as war criminals.[137]

In another "My Dear Friends" letter dated 18 February 1946, he emphasized the consistency of his ideology before and after the war:

> I have always fought against loveless power, and worked to build a paradise on earth. With the end of the Great East Asian War my thoughts turn to the need for Japan to become a goddess of peace based on the realization that killing people is the worst evil on earth. That is why George Washington admonishes that putting an end to war is the first of the three great American principles to be observed.
>
> In spite of this, constant warfare has victimized hundreds of millions of people. While the survivors yearn for the eradication of war and the salvation of humankind from its scourges, they

have no voice. A better memorial for these noble victims, rather than at altars with incense and flowers, will be by building a paradise on earth through the establishment of a permanent world peace and ensuring that all peoples live as brothers in peace and harmony.

To achieve that goal, the absolute basic policy must be to abolish weapons and redistribute food, clothing, and shelter worldwide. I declare this will be much more effective than organizing any number of United Nations organizations.[138]

In March 1946 he drew up an "Initiative," as he called it, on everlasting peace worldwide and sent it by mail to Shizue, his wife, with the following instructions:

I have drawn up the "Initiative" as a prayer for the souls of the war victims and must be read by as many as possible. It must be printed and distributed widely. Those who wish to develop virtue can reproduce it and send it to their friends as a postcard for happiness. The worldwide famine is a proof that the souls of the war victims have yet to be laid to rest in peace. The war dead did not die in vain, and their spirits are still troubled.

The document read thus:

The Initiative

The cruelest thing is killing and the worst is in war.
Since time immemorial many have worked to prevent war.
Nevertheless, we have known incessant wars with hundreds of millions wasted in carnage.

These noble victims yearn to put and end to war and save humankind forever from its horrors, but they do not have voices.

The best service we can perform in their honor is to establish eternal world peace, save humanity, and so build a paradise on earth in which we can all live happily as brothers and sisters.

I therefore declare that I shall be the mouthpiece and the messenger of these victims, and work tirelessly to achieve the grand objective through global disarmament and the distribution of the essentials, such as food, clothing, and shelter.

Anyone who does not support this movement is a coward and his sons and heirs shall not prosper. Those who oppose

> the initiative are enemies of humankind and invite misfortune for posterity. Those who support the proposal and cooperate will be assured of their reward in future generations.
>
> The victims of war will long live in the minds of men and in eternal union with nature, and the families they left behind will be protected. I offer this initiative to the gods and Buddha and all the spirits and I beg that they watch over us and protect us so that we may expeditiously achieve our objectives.
>
> — Initiator, Sasakawa Ryoichi
>
> [seal][139]

Sasakawa explained his "Initiative" to his friends in a letter dated 18 May 1946:

> Those of us detained here by the US Army have no fear of starvation, but I worry my head off night and day for compatriots who are doomed to suffer under the vicious inflation and to be tormented by starvation because of cowardly and irresponsible politicians. The strength of my anger can shake the walls of my cell, but what can I do from inside jail?
>
> I pray before every meal for the peace of the spirits of the war dead and for a rich harvest by reciting the Initiative to myself, thereby renewing my commitment before the gods and Buddha and all spirits, known and unknown, to global disarmament and distribution of food, clothing, and shelter for the ultimate goal of eternally rescuing humankind from the scourge of war.[140]

Sasakawa, as we have seen, had attended a Buddhist place of instruction, the local temple he went to in his mid teens, scrubbing the floors in the early hours of the morning. That education showed in those months when he faced life inside Sugamo and rubbed shoulders with Japan's war leaders on a daily basis. No other person in detention there had the temerity to dash off peace appeals, letters to world leaders, appeals to the prime minister and prayers for peace.

Two decades later, Sasakawa was much of the same mind — to uphold the cause of peace. In April 1964 he used his enormous private funds to construct a "Memorial Dedicated to the Victims of All Wars" in Ibaragi in Osaka Prefecture. In August of the same year he also established a foundation called the "War Memorial Association for the Victims of All Wars." The memorial is in the form of a large sphere made at great expense of duralumin to withstand rusting and the destructive power of typhoons.[141]

Sasakawa's multifarious activities as a global philanthropist, starting in the 1970s are extensions of the "Initiative" launched from Suga-

mo Prison under conditions that must now seem all but indescribable in terms of their squalor and suffering.

Everything began there.

VII

Freed

On 24 December 1948 Sasakawa was discharged from Sugamo Prison with other Class A war crime suspects, including Kishi Nobusuke and Kodama Yoshio. None of them had been charged. After his release Sasakawa lost no time in providing support for the families of those who had been executed and families whose members were still serving out their terms in prison. He never abandoned them.

Once out of prison, he was a veritable one-man powerhouse when it came to caring for those who were still inside. He did so against a broad background of concern over current events. Sasakawa had repeatedly made mention in his diary of the crucial importance of providing redress and relief to the victims of war.

> Hate sin, and not the sinner. What do we do for the families of the war criminals? One cannot speak of humanitarianism without considering this point. This applies alike to the United States, Japan, and the world.[142]

On 12 February 1946 he noted:

> We must help families not to lose their means of livelihood. Lawyers must be encouraged to help win relief for the suspects. The Communist Party puts up a front that it is a humanitarian organization. It appeals to the public as a people-loving party. In reality, it is doing its best to make war criminals of fellow Japanese. They are liars, and it is an evil party.[143]

On 14 May 1946 he returned to the subject:

> Human beings are selfish. In war every country treats its men in uniform and their families well, and bereaved families too. But once the war is over both the winning country and the loser forget all about compensation for their fighting men and the injured. What can we say about Japan? After 15 August 1945 even official burials were conducted according to military rank. What defamation of the war dead! Given this sort of attitude, how can victims of war be able to rest in peace?[144]

There was no end to his lament, as he wrote in this entry made on 15 May 1946:

> During the war the dead heroes and the families they have left behind, as well as the fighting men themselves, are treated well, but as soon as the war is over they are given the cold shoulder. This ungratefulness is common to both the victor and the defeated. It is particularly inexcusable where the dead are concerned. Japan would do well, in defeat, to conduct memorial services for the dead. Why hesitate?... Those of you outside, pick up your courage. Don't be cowards. Let us all, the winners and the losers, remember the dead and offer our eternal respect to the bereaved families and those who died for us.[145]

Four months later he wrote:

> Those who fail to put themselves in the shoes of those who are in jail and to consider their anxious families are beasts, not men. Neither rank nor birth can change that.[146]

Newspapers, radios, and record players

The first thing Sasakawa did after his release in 1948 was to send in newspapers, radios, record players, and records to the men who were still detained. He wrote constantly comforting and encouraging letters in spite of all the many tasks he had to attend to. He visited Sugamo frequently, and when he was not available he sent members of his family to talk to those still serving sentences in prison. Shibuichi Mitsuo, who worked under Sasakawa for a long time, told me that sending in the newspapers alone cost Sasakawa 30,000 to 40,000 yen a month.[147]

Sasakawa was tireless. He petitioned the US authorities to reduce the sentences imposed, covered the travel expenses of their families living in the countryside to visit Sugamo, and gave them financial support. He bore in mind others who were still detained overseas. Thus Sasakawa remembered those Class B and C war criminals detained in Muntinlupa Camp in the Philippines. There, the conditions were far worse than in Sugamo.

The Sasakawa family received thousands of thank you letters from those still held in jail and their families. The family has kept the letters to this day. They speak of Sasakawa's exceptional kindness and their profound gratitude to him. Then, as now, society tended to treat war criminals as villains rather than as victims. It was risky for Sasakawa to have assisted them or to help them in regaining their honor. Knowing this, the prisoners were all the more grateful to Sasakawa for his dedication.

In time recognition came his way.

Yamaura Kan'ichi, a well-known commentator, had this to say in an article he wrote titled "War Criminals Released." Published in the *Tokyo Shimbun* on 21 June 1952:

> To the best of my knowledge, Sasakawa Ryoichi started the movement to free the war criminals and to support their families. He too was detained in Sugamo as one of the suspects but on the very day he was released he began this campaign.
>
> It was difficult to openly undertake it in those days, for unlike today the United States held strong views about the war criminals, to the extent that any Japanese who would initiate a movement of this sort was labeled anti-American and faced the danger of being sent back to Sugamo.
>
> Sasakawa gave up smoking and drinking and dedicated himself to the cause he supported. He involved his family, notably his seventy-seven-year-old mother, his wife, brothers, and employees.
>
> Since this man, the initiator of the support and release campaign, is a former right-wing leader it is easy for those who seek to criticize to associate what he has undertaken with such causes as Japan's rearmament and anticommunism. But that's being jealous. A good deed is a good deed regardless of who does it.[148]

The letters

Some of the letters Sasakawa received from thankful prisoners and their families appear below:

Letter 1

> I am most grateful for your frequent letters. I learned with great emotion from men working at the golf course about your recent visit to Mr. Saito with your kind and gracious wife....
>
> During my interview the other day with Mr. Tsukamoto, head of Sugamo Branch Prison, he spoke of you saying, he wished that there had been even one more, if not five, like you among the Class A men who were let free. Mr. Yoshimura of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also said that you were the only one who visited the Ministry to talk about helping those still serving sentences.[149]

Letter 2

Thank you for your generous gift of the record player, which men in every ward and on every floor have in turn enjoyed. We were also deeply moved to learn that you had generously supported our amateur performances on 26-27 September. We know only too well that there must be many things that occupy you now that you are free.

You have not only generously sent each of us comforting presents but your own good mother and wife have also shown the same warm understanding.

I am without words to express my profound gratitude.[150]

Letter 3

I thank you for your welcome letter received today. I have nothing but gratitude for you and your whole family for working for us in so many ways.... Indeed, soon after you left the jail you wrote to many of us and I wanted to write to tell you how moved I was, but not knowing you in person I hesitated, and now a postcard has arrived from you, written by your wife. I deeply regret my earlier idleness.

All of us have ingrained in our memory a deep gratitude and respect for you, sir. How many of the former leaders, classified as Class A and B, are working for us? Indeed when most of them are merely concerned about defending their own interests and thus bending their long-held beliefs my respect for you makes me feel especially close.

I am sorry I cannot adequately express the depth of my feelings.[151]

The punishments of December 1948

Events, it may be noted, had followed their course at Sugamo. Tojo Hideki and six others had suffered the supreme penalty. They were executed on 23 December 1948.

For the others: All Class A prisoners not charged were released by 24 December. Twenty-five Class A war criminals were indicted and found guilty. Seven leaders were hanged and the remaining eighteen were given either life sentences or very long prison terms. There were many Class B and C war criminals as shown in Table 1. Defendants under US jurisdiction were all interned at Sugamo from the beginning. But

those tried, sentenced, and executed by other countries were kept in jails overseas under far worse conditions.

This broad picture is evident in table 1:

Table 1. No. of Class B and C war crimes suspects by country of detention and trial

Country	No. of Cases	No. of people	Death	Life imprisonment	Fixed term	Not guilty	Others
The USA	456	1,453	143(3)*	162(2)*	871	188	89
The UK	330	978	223	54	502	116	83
Australia	294	949	153	38	455	267	36
Netherlands	448	1,038	236(10)†	28(1)†	705	55	14
France	39	230	63(37)‡	23(4)‡	112(2)‡	31	1
Philippines	72	196	17	87	27	11	27
China**	605	883	149	83	272	350	29
Total	2,244	5,700	984	475	2944	1,018	279

Note: "China," as found in the table above, refers not to the Communist but to the Kuomintang government of China. Numbers in the column marked "Death" includes execution by firing squad and hanging carried out by the United States, Britain, Australia, and the Philippines. Imprisonment for an indefinite period includes imprisonment for life. The "Others" column includes cases in which an indictment was withdrawn, the case dismissed, the judgment overturned, or cases of repatriation for reasons of sickness, or escape, and unknown outcome.[152]

* Numbers in brackets denote sentences commuted after conviction.
† Numbers in brackets denote sentences commuted after conviction.
‡Numbers in brackets denote those not arrested but tried in absentia.
** "China" refers not to the Communist government but to the Kuomintang government of China.
Numbers in the "Death" column include execution by firing squad and hanging carried out by the United States, Britain, Australia, and the Philippines. Imprisonment for an indefinite period includes imprisonment for life. The "Others" column includes cases whose indictment was withdrawn, the case dismissed, the judgment overturned, or cases of repatriation for reasons of sickness or escape, and unknown outcome.
Source: Tokyo Saiban Handobukku Henshu Iinkai [Tokyo Trial Handbook Editorial Committee] ed., *Tokyo Saiban Handobukku* [Tokyo Trial Handbook] (Tokyo: Aokishoten, 1989), 219.

Some countries chose to send their prisoners back to Japan rather than keep them in detention. Some 121 prisoners of France, serving sentences overseas, were repatriated to Sugamo in May 1950; and 693 prisoners of the Dutch were returned to Japan in December the same year. Seventy prisoners held by Britain and Australia, and serving their terms in Hong Kong were repatriated to Sugamo in May 1951; and 231 more from Singapore on 14 August 1951.

However, the repatriation of prisoners in Kuomintang Chinese and Soviet custody, as well as those held under Philippine jurisdiction and in Australian custody on Manus Island had to await the final realization of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952 or even later.[153]

A cruel twist: Article 11

Japanese independence, as realized by the San Francisco treaty signed in September 1951, had immediate implications for Sugamo. Following the signature of the treaty the operation and management of Sugamo Prison was transferred to the Japanese as of 15 February 1952. After 28 April 1952, the day when the peace treaty came into force, the prison came under the jurisdiction of the Japanese government both in name and fact, and its name was changed from Sugamo Prison to Sugamo Keimusho in Japanese. At the time, there were 111 Japanese detained in the Philippine Muntinlupa jail and another 206 in the Australian Manus Island jail. Their custodianship was transferred to Japan in July 1953 and August 1953 respectively.

With Sugamo back under Japanese custodianship prison conditions improved substantially. It was established, as juridical practice, that war crimes would not be considered as "previous offenses" under Japanese law. Moreover, prisoners were entitled to cast absentee ballots in elections and to do so from the prison. Food rations improved as well. While ordinary jails in Japan allocated 50 yen a day per head for food, Sugamo had a budget of 120 yen per person. Inmates were given free access to newspapers and library books, and were served tea and coffee. Five cigarettes a day were distributed. Baths were available every day. There were no longer any restrictions on visitors. Forced labor without compensation as practiced under the Occupation management ceased; labor was now compensated and prisoners were offered a choice of working or not. Prisoners were allowed to enjoy outings on parole. After February 1953 public employment agencies started offering them jobs outside.

With these changes for the better Sasakawa's relief activities gained momentum. In addition to his regular visits to the prison he arranged to speak to the men to encourage them, while Shizue played her *biwa* (Japanese lute), and recited classical Chinese poetry. With the thought

of preparing the men for employment after they were released, Sasakawa donated an automobile and made arrangements with the police so that the men could get driving licenses while still at Sugamo.

There was a problem, however. Prisoners were still not actually released even after Japan recovered its independence. This was in accordance with Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stated in part:

> Japan will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be excercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

During the period when Sugamo Prison was under the de facto control of the US Army, commutation and parole were readily implemented. But after Japan achieved independence in 1952 these matters were subject to diplomatic negotiation, making the release of prisoners more difficult.

Prisoners of their own country?

Naturally, this development was unexpected and disappointing for most of the prisoners. They had hoped for speedy release after independence. Under the circumstances they were all the more grateful to Sasakawa for his support. Their letters speak for themselves.

Letter from Hoshino Naoki, 29 May 1952

> Thank you so much for visiting us with your wife. It was indeed thoughtful of you, and timely, to have brought the great Mr. Machino.[154] I believe that it is very effective to bring elected representatives as you do to Sugamo. I also believe that the grand venture of liberating Sugamo has advanced a step and I express my sincere respects for your efforts.
>
> Thanks to you, those who were depressed after the peace treaty, particularly the young, have felt their morale boosted, and their faces brightened yesterday for the first time in many

weeks. As I listened to your good wife recite a Japanese poem I could not control my tears.

Due to lack of resourcefulness, and above all their negligence, the government and diplomats have committed one blunder after another [a reference to the government's approval of Article 11 of the peace treaty]. Liberation of war criminals has become a challenging venture requiring enormous legal maneuverability and power. There is no one else besides you. It is not an exaggeration to say that tens of millions depend on you alone. I can only beseech you to keep working at it.[155]

Letter to Sasakawa Shizue from an old family friend

Allow me to write you a letter of gratitude. You have graciously taken the trouble and time to visit us today at Sugamo Prison for which I have no adequate words to express my appreciation.

On that occasion I thoroughly enjoyed myself listening to your exquisite recitation of poems and music on the *biwa.* They were the kinds of entertainment I had wished for all along and I deeply enjoyed the passionate rendering of your program, as did all the others as you saw. It would be redundant for me to describe their excitement here for fear of spoiling your memory. Please let me express all my emotions by just saying thank you.

I knew your father and your brother rather well during my time in China, and every time your name was mentioned it brought back many a fond memory. Since then your husband has written frequently to encourage us and you can imagine how his few but warm words have been music to the sensitive emotions peculiar to us war criminals.

Your husband continues to work untiringly for us with the zeal of family and kin. For seven long years since the end of the war, from the time when few paid attention to us (or if they did, it was anything but hospitable) you and your husband have shown us consistent sympathy and understanding, rare in our populous country where even family planning is necessary.

The way you shower indiscriminate blessings on us like the sun and the moon is unparalleled and wins our unbounded gratitude. The unquestioning respect and love we have for you, young and old without any exception, as for our own mother and father and without any of the cynicism that colors our times, can only be the fruit of the inspiration you give.

I am concerned in my heart of hearts that in today's rough

world you must face many difficulties, particularly where material things are concerned. The chivalrous spirit of your husband was a national asset even in prewar times, but to see him boldly and without vacillation obeying his firm convictions under the present circumstances and to have you there supporting and encouraging him with your benevolence has been a source of hope to us. We are gratefully reminded of our enormous debt to you as we enjoy the daily gift of your newspaper.[156]

Letter to Sasakawa

I have no adequate words to thank you for visiting us with your wife the other day. Indeed, I have nothing but admiration for your untiring devotion and efforts on behalf of all of us in Sugamo. A few years back, when some of us on occasion organized an in-house entertainment, you generously supported us each time. Later, when I created Sugamo Gakuen [an educational initiative started voluntarily by the inmates in April 1949, whose lectures were given in turn by the prisoners] and were even short of chalk for the blackboard, I turned to you without any introduction for assistance. How delighted we were when you responded with your characteristic generosity and supplied us with ten boxes of chalk every month. There is no one at Sugamo who fails to be grateful for your constant kindness through the newspapers you provide, the private visits you make and the many encouraging postcards you send.

I now learn that as a consequence of your passionate persuasion of Mr. Machino Takema and political leaders and parties, including even the communists, preparations are underway for parliament to adopt a resolution for our release. We marvel at the greatness of your vision and the innovative ways you work for us.[157]

Letter from Segawa Masumi

I admire my respected *sensei* everyday as an incarnation of the great Saigo Takamori (1827-77).[158] On 3 June you were accompanied by the honorable Maeda Ikuo, an elected representative from my home town of Kagoshima. Being easily moved, I quietly wiped away my tears with a yellow cloth I had, the moment the two of you entered the auditorium. I shall make sure that this emotional encounter will be remembered forever by my sons

and their sons.

There are voices among us at Sugamo to urge Sasakawa *sensei*'s candidacy for a seat in the House of Councilors from a nationwide constituency. There is no word to adequately thank you for your most pure compassion and sincere commitment with which you have undertaken to salvage us war criminals. Through each word of this inadequate letter I have tried to convey to you my profound sense of gratitude.[159]

Letter from Kawaguchi Kiyotake

I thankfully acknowledge receipt of your six-page letter dated 11 July, which arrived on 16 July. I am most grateful that you continue to work energetically for us at the height of summer. You have personally brought top political party executives and over one hundred members of both houses of parliament to Sugamo, and convinced their obstinate and disinterested minds to have both Houses pass the resolutions concerning the release of war criminals. The saying "An act of sincerity moves heavens" literally applies to you. Please accept my sincere respects.

Everyone at Sugamo, as well as those who were detained in overseas jails, promised without exception to do their best for the war criminals once they got out. No doubt they meant what they said but when they came to it there was a lack of will and passion so that their impressive promises usually ended up in disappointment. By contrast, you presented a motion in the Diet and roused public opinion in our favor, although you are still under the shadow of a public purge. There was a common understanding among those who had been purged to keep quiet in order to speed up the end of the purge. I bow my head to you.

You did not stop there. You went on to organize a Parliamentarians League for the Release of War Criminals, while enlisting one hundred and twenty-plus members from the Liberal Party [Ji'yu-to] alone to effect the release of all prisoners, both in and outside of Japan. We are truly indebted to you.

I learned that on 25 June, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, communists and Korean student demonstrators assembled at Machikaneyama in Osaka. Fifty of them broke from the group and, while on their way to Suita via Hattori,[160] forced their way into your home where your mother lives, swearing and shouting that releasing war criminals was proof

that Japan wished to restart the war. Your seventy-seven-year-old mother stood her ground and told off the hooligans, bravely saying that she regarded their attack as proof of the success of her son's work. Like mother like son! I was deeply impressed.

I shared your precious letter with those serving time and life sentences (wearing red prison clothes) as well as those on death row (in their blue uniforms). All were deeply moved and I know that some have written directly to thank you. We admire your noble spirit and willingness to sacrifice yourself, undeterred by death, for a moral rebirth. The country needs someone like you, a selfless man of action. Please look after yourself well, and be careful not to sacrifice yourself unnecessarily, for we want you to hold out till the end.[161]

VIII

With the transfer of Sugamo Prison to Japan in 1952, the prisoners held there, eager to see some forward movement and loath to spend more years sequestered in jail, organized what they called a Sugamo Release Committee (Sugamo Shakuho Iinkai), later renamed the Sugamo Steering Committee (Sugamo Un'ei Iinkai). At the same time, they launched a campaign for their release. In April of that year, three months after the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect, the following petition was sent by the representatives of Class B and C prisoners to the prime minister, the foreign minister, the justice minister, and the chairman of the Central Rehabilitation Committee, a body that had the authority to recommend countries concerned temporary discharge and release of prisoners.

This petition read as follows:

In the light of the nature of war crimes and the principles of peace and reconciliation, all prisoners serving war sentences should have been released with the coming into force of the peace treaty in April 1952.

It is regrettable that the government not only failed to realize this, but continues to hold us in custody more than ninety days after the treaty came into force.

We, therefore, earnestly request that the government immediately recommend to the governments concerned the general release of Class B and C detainees, based on its ex officio examination so that we will be discharged between15 August (the anniversary of the end of the war) and 8 September (the anniversary of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty).

Copies of this petition were sent to the speaker of the House of Representatives, president of the House of Councilors, the president of the Japan Federation of Lawyers, the president of the Supporters' Organization of the War Convicts, Fujiwara Ginjiro, the director of Sugamo Prison — and Sasakawa Ryoichi. Sasakawa was the only person sent the petition who held no official post. This suggests the extent of the trust the prisoners placed in him.

In fact, he had up his sleeve what he called "an atom bomb" of a strategy for their release. He wrote:

> It would require enormous time and expense to mobilize organizations to collect 10 million signatures.
>
> However, the war convicts and their families cannot endure further delay. Since the government has signed Article 11 of the peace treaty, it would be difficult to obtain immediate release without an atomic bomb-like scheme. I have, after much thought and deliberation, often lying awake in the middle of the night, devised a well-thought-out plan that has in part already been acted on.
>
> 1. To move the Diet, the representative organ of the Japanese people, to submit a resolution requesting immediate release of all war criminals.
>
> (a) To negotiate with the secretaries-general of each political party concerning the submission of the resolution. Negotiation took place on 19 May with Secretary General Masuda Kaneshichi of the Liberal Party and Secretary General Miki Takeo of the Kaishin-to (Progressive) Party. Likewise I had a negotiation with Mizutani Chosaburo, acting secretary general of the Right-wing Socialist Party, on 21 May.
>
> Negotiations were held on 22 May with Nomizo Masaru, secretary general of the Left-wing Socialist Party. In addition, I have an appointment next week with Representative Kazahaya Yasoji of the Communist Party.
>
> (b) To work on the leading politicians of each political party to encourage their secretaries general as well as to convince their fellow representatives to adopt the resolution concerned.
>
> (c) To accompany top party leaders to Sugamo to call on the prisoners from their home towns to remind them of the plight of those from their constituencies.
>
> Those whom I had already taken were Miki Takeo of the Progressive Party on 21 May, Mizutani Chozaburo, policy council chairman of the Right-wing Socialist Party on 23 May, and Murakami Isamu, standing member of the Liberal Party's Gen-

eral Affairs Committee on 24 May. Future plans include visits by Shi'ikuma Saburo and Yoshida Yasushi, executives of the Progressive Party on 26 May, Kanda Hiroshi, Executive Council member, and others from the Liberal Party on 27 May. Among others I took on 29 May were Hirai Yoshikazu, Executive Council member, and other executives such as Uda Jiro and Konishi Toramatsu of the Liberal Party, and Arita Ki'ichi, an executive of the Progressive Party.

2. To work on every prefectural assembly to submit the same resolution demanding immediate release of the prisoners. This may seem superfluous but has the desired effect of enlisting public opinion.

3. To aggressively mobilize governors of the prefectures for the purpose of comforting the prisoners and supporting their families.[162]

Characteristically, Sasakawa moved forward on several fronts at the same time. *Sasakawa Ryoichi Kankei Bunsho* (Sasakawa papers) contains a copy of a letter he sent to prefectural governors, and to mayors of cities, towns and villages throughout Japan to achieve his strategies (2) and (3). This courteous alert read as follows:

Dear Sir,

As we approach summer I trust this finds you in good health and successful in your endeavors.

Let me alert you to a situation I think you may wish to be informed about. Many of our war criminals are misunderstood as being consummate villains due to the misinformation of their enemies. Some of these prisoners had overreacted, angered at having their homes bombed and family members killed. They may have killed, but only under orders. The victors, however, have also overreacted by imposing the maximum penalty on their former Japanese captors in revenge even for slight offences such as being slapped in the face or refused a cigarette. Our enemies have committed their own atrocities on war criminal suspects since the war and even after the excitement of war had cooled. I for one was detained in Sugamo as a Class A war criminal suspect and was acquitted and released on 24 December 1948. During my three years in jail I have been punched in the face and chest for impertinence. As a result, on one occasion, I ran a high fever. The next day I was ordered back to hard labor and eventually fell ill. They gave me a pack at night, but dragged

me out of bed to force me back to work the following day. If the enemy could do this even after the frenzy of the war had passed, how would they have behaved had they found themselves in the same dire conditions as the Japanese troops?

Our war criminals are national victims who deserve our sympathy. They and their families had believed that, with the peace treaty, they would all be released, but now they find themselves living ignominiously in jail even after its ratification. This has to be rectified by what I think of as an atom bomb-like expediency. I beg you, therefore, to show sympathy for the war criminals and their families and adopt by unanimous consent a resolution requesting their immediate release. I would make this request to you in person but because of the urgency of the matter I must ask your understanding that I appeal to you by letter. I shall also be appealing in writing to prefectural, city, and municipal assemblies to adopt a resolution similar to that passed by the Diet and to deliberate on taking appropriate measures to comfort and support the detainees and their families.

Yours sincerely,[163]

Leaving no stone unturned, Sasakawa even drafted an appeal to the Throne. The following draft of a letter intended for the Showa emperor in his own handwriting is kept at the Nippon Foundation:

In the face of the unparalleled disgrace and the first surrender since the beginning of our history, the people were moved by Your Majesty's proclamation to end the war and found strength and comfort in your presence. Having said this, there is a matter of great import for which I must beg your indulgence and bring before your attention, namely that a great number of war convicts languish in jail even after the restoration of our independence.

Today there is much deliberation, even in the countries that were victorious, as to whether war trials are legally and morally justifiable. Some legal experts say that trials do little more than gratify the victors' desire for revenge, and make a show of power. They contend it represents a shame to civilization and is the worst blunder of the recent war. The process and substance of the recent trial were clearly marred by injustice and unreasonableness, and those sentenced were "victims of the worst injustice," to quote Dr. R.B. Pal, one of the panel of judges at the Tokyo International Trial.

> With the peace treaty in place and independence recovered, common sense dictates that all war crime detainees should be released. Having experienced the worst of the war, they are well qualified to be the apostles of peace. Their families, too, suffer distress and sorrow instead of the honor and protection they deserve for offering their loving husbands, sons, and brothers for Your Majesty and their country.
>
> I write because your people know of Your Majesty's deep concern for them. At this critical time a concrete expression of this by Your Majesty in behalf of the suffering families and the immediate release of the detainees would be profoundly appreciated by all your subjects.
>
> It will win the hearts and minds of all Japanese and preserve the beauty and strength of the imperial system.
>
> I humbly beg Your Majesty's august consideration.

Whether this letter was ever presented at the palace and, if so, whether it reached the Showa emperor is unknown. Even if the letter had been presented to him, given the negative mood against war crime convicts, it would have been unrealistic to expect the emperor to take any action for the prisoners' release, and it might well have been counterproductive, as the Left would have been quick to portray any such move as a sign of the resurgence of the prewar imperial system. But still, this letter indicates Sasakawa's passionate commitment.

It took until 1958....

Efforts to free the war criminals grew into a nationwide campaign. With the support of many people a War Convicts Supporters Group (Senso Jukeisha Sewa-kai) was established on 10 May 1952. Between 12 June 1952 and 19 July 1955, the House of Representatives passed no fewer than six related resolutions, while the House of Councilors passed three of its own. It took until 30 May 1958 for the authorities to bring about a final result. The last eighteen convicts still being held were then granted "temporary discharge" as required by the United States. By 29 December their sentences were reduced, and finally, with the exception of those imprisoned in Communist China, the last war criminals were free.

Sasakawa continued to organize memorial services for those who had been executed as war criminals, and found ways to help their families carry on daily life. There was much to do. In March 1953 the bereaved families had formed an association called the White Chrysanthemum Society (Shiragiku Izoku Kai) with Yamashita Hisako, the widow of General Yamashita Takebumi who had been executed in the Philippines, as

its first president. The society erected a Guardian Deity of Peace (Heiwa Minoshiro Jizoson) in Gokokuji, a temple near Ikebukuro in Tokyo. Buddhist memorial services were held regularly for the 1,068 men who were executed.

When the memorial services at Gokokuji were discontinued, Sasakawa offered his home in Sengoku, Tokyo, as a place to hold services on the eighteenth of each month. These services continued up to 1971 and altogether were held 241 times. When no home could be found for the stone Guardian Deity of Peace, Sasakawa made space for it at his own home. In due course, the venue of the memorial services moved to the tenth floor of the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation's building, where from 1972 the ceremonies were held twice yearly, in January and September, to make it easier for family members, many of whom were now elderly, to attend. Finally, on 18 January 1993, the White Chrysanthemum Society was dissolved, and the services were discontinued. All along it had been Sasakawa who had kept them going. He urged banks and corporations to make donations as "incense money" to cover the society's expenses. In due course, Kimura Kaho, the widow of General Kimura Heitaro, succeeded Mrs. Yamashita as the second president of the association. She was said to have commented that the White Chrysanthemum Society, even with the membership of 1,068 bereaved families of executed Class A, B, and C war criminals, would not have continued had it not have been for Mr. Sasakawa's support since it lacked financial resources.[164]

An eyewitness record

Onishi Hajime, who was detained in Sugamo as a Class B war criminal, has described how Sasakawa devoted himself to the prisoners and their families, and how he was respected by them:

> Sasakawa Ryoichi spent three full years in Sugamo as a suspect at the Far East International Military Tribunal from December 1945 to the same month in 1948 when he was released. We can never forget how he constantly maintained friendly communication with the young detainees who found themselves blown by circumstances into the prison like small abandoned boats, encouraging them with warm sympathy and strong leadership and providing us with a sense of purpose in life. At a time when people tended to be apologetic in their dealings with the US authorities Sasakawa was true to his convictions and demanded fearlessly what he felt was our right, which left us in awe of him. He had once led a political party and showed a capacity for orga-

nizing people.

After his discharge, he and his wife continued to comfort men in the jail, all the while encouraging and supporting their families including those whose members had been executed. He deplored the way society looked down on the detainees, which he put down to US Army propaganda, and he took it on himself to influence powerful politicians to come to their rescue. On many occasions Sasakawa brought them to Sugamo, affording us opportunities to give them true accounts of the war trials. Today, most citizens look at us with sympathy in place of disgust, thanks largely to the efforts of Mr. Sasakawa.

In 1950 a religious group called the White Water Lily Association (Byakuren-sha) was established to conduct memorial services for those who were executed and to comfort the detainees. When the association was dissolved two years later the White Chrysanthemum Society (Shiragiku Izoku-kai) was left without a sponsor, Mr. Sasakawa lost no time in offering his home for the bereaved families to continue their memorial services each month. The services are still held regularly today. It has become customary for many political and former military men to pay respects to the dead at the invitation of the survivors' association and Mr. Sasakawa.

These monthly meetings have given immeasurable hope and courage to grief-stricken families. Family members who just wept each time they saw each other are more relaxed today and they are beginning to engage in animated conversation, often for long hours....

Mr. Sasakawa's high-mindedness and achievements are refreshing in today's morally corrupt world and he has our singular respect.[165]

Who knows of these services?

Sasakawa's endeavors in behalf of war criminals and their families are barely known outside circles close to him. This is partly due to Sasakawa's dislike of self-advertisement, but it seems to me to have something to do with the overriding concern people have for protecting themselves against taking any kind of risk — even of assigning praise where it is due.

When the White Chrysanthemum Society was dissolved in 1993, the Tokyo Broadcasting Station put together a special program in which it simply stated that the memorial services had been held earlier at the

Sasakawa home, and the last service was hosted by "that Mr. Sasakawa." It would not have taken much investigation to learn that Sasakawa's contribution was decisive to the existence of the association. This is another example of the formidable hold the Sasakawa taboo had on the media and on intellectuals.

Teru's part

Incidentally, Sasakawa's mother, Teru, kept up until 1957 her daily homage at a Shinto shrine, rain or shine, to pray for the early release of the convicts. She died at the age of eighty-two on 17 January 1958. Before her death she called Sasakawa to her bedside and instructed him "not to give me a funeral until everybody is released from Sugamo."[166] In fact, Teru's funeral did not take place until 17 June 1958, a month after the last person had been formally discharged from Sugamo Prison.

Sasakawa made his position known in many ways, large and small, regarding the lingering issue of the detained war criminals. Thus, he refrained from smoking and drinking, not to speak of taking no part in politics, until all the convicts were freed. When he finally invited to his home the last eighteen men from Sugamo, he downed a glass of beer with great gusto.[167]

Honoring the war dead

This was not the end of Sasakawa's commitment to honoring those who had suffered on the Japanese side. During World War Two many Japanese soldiers and civilians died in East Asia and the Pacific islands, and 1.5 million failed to return home. In 1975 the Japan War-Bereaved Association (Izokukai) planned to send a delegation composed mainly of the children of the war dead to collect the remains. Sasakawa and his Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation (JSIF) supported the project generously, and Sasakawa himself led the delegation to the South Pacific islands, paying expenses from his own pocket. In that same year the governments of Japan and the Philippines agreed to erect a war memorial in the Calamanian Islands.

The JSIF provided the funds for a twelve-hectare memorial park, including a Japanese garden, around the cenotaph. In addition, the association has since 1978 provided subsidies for memorial events held annually to cherish the memories of the civilians who died in air raids and bombings.[168] During all this time, Sasakawa was continuing to play a leading role in helping convicted war criminals and conducting memorial events for all those who died as victims of the war.

IX

One of the salient characteristics of Sasakawa was that he did not hesitate to criticize the United States openly when he felt it was deserved. At the same time he kept an open mind, free from the inferiority complex that he feared had become the hallmark of his compatriots. In one of his letters addressed to "Dear friends" he compared the way Japanese and American prosecutors carried out their investigations.

> When I was detained without being convicted ten years ago [in Osaka, from 1935 to 1938] I often shared my candid views regarding the state of our justice system out of my love of the country and respect for the law. My openness was repaid with bitterness. I did not have a single happy memory of those interrogations. Yet all I did was ask for a comprehensive investigation of myself and others in order to search the truth of the matter. Still, those [Japanese] investigators treated me cruelly and despotically. By contrast, interrogations by the US Army were quite pleasant.
>
> Out of my respect and goodwill, I often spoke boldly and frankly, articulating on behalf of the Japanese people, and pointing out where the Americans had contradicted themselves. Not once were my comments received with displeasure, nor was I ever treated badly. My interrogators were gentlemen. Those in authority in Japan would do well to learn from them. I pray that the day will come, hopefully soon, when the cowardly and self-seeking power holders in our country who swim with the tide and bow to the money and military might of the US forces, will be replaced by true Japanese who will be called upon to rebuild a peaceful Japan.[169]

One of the arrows in Sasakawa's quiver was humor, if necessary of the bawdy variety. When the US Army prosecutors asked him about his relationship with Kawashima Yoshiko, Sasakawa replied as follows:

> Relations between men and women belong after dark. What takes place after dark is a private matter. I am an upright man above my waist but I give no guarantees below it. I beg you not to ask questions on such matters.

This response caused his questioner to burst out laughing. Sasakawa later wrote about this incident:

> It is desirable for both interrogator and the interrogated to have a bit of latitude. When you have a stern and uptight Japanese investigator, and a Japanese defendant who can't crack a joke — well, the truth may not emerge so easily. Japanese prosecutors, in particular, have a lot to learn. They take things too personally and they bear grudges. In that regard I thought the American prosecutors were so much more human. One may pound on the table to make a point but they do not hold things against one. Frankly, they were disinterested and free of self."[170]

On the sincerity of lawyers

Among the papers kept at the Nippon Foundation are some letters exchanged between Sasakawa Ryoichi and Kawashima Yoshiko. Sasakawa refers to himself in this correspondence as "icchan" (part of his name "Ryoichi" in child's language) and Kawashima calls him "onii-chan" or "my big brother." It appears that Kawashima, used by the army and in constant danger of assassination, lived a lonely and dangerous life but trusted Sasakawa.

American lawyers left an indelible memory on Sasakawa for their sincere defense of Japanese who were accused or under suspicion.

> It may be difficult for Japanese to understand their mindset, but I imagine it to be the fruit of the nobility of mind that accepts truth as a matter that supersedes all ethnic groups and national borders. Is it at the same time the reflection of a truly democratic state? A person can be cynical about the international war trial but he cannot but at the same time bow unconditionally to the sincerity of the American lawyers.[171]

Sasakawa was the last person to seek to ingratiate himself to the US Occupation forces or the prosecution in the war crimes trial. In fact, he did not hesitate to criticize any behavior he thought was contradictory to American democracy. Yet, "Americans who claim to respect freedom, equality and human rights do not treat me accordingly," Sasakawa wrote in his diary.[172]

And again:

> Americans are easygoing about their own misdoings and tough on others, thus severely punishing the Japanese for their misbehavior. It is a white lie that Americans respect human rights....[173] They are clever. They pretend to treat you with respect but torment you mentally. The Japanese does not torment you men-

> tally but does not treat you with respect either. Which is the greater evil?[174]

Admiral Yamamoto and the Americans

As described above in Chapter 1, Sasakawa thought like Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku in that he was reluctant to launch war against America. But once the war began he threw himself into the cause with all his strength. He was not shy to declare himself the number one war proponent of war in the country.[175]

Yet after the war his cool-headed judgment made him see that the world would evolve around a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. He therefore devoted his energy to building close relations with the United States. At first glance this may appear inconsistent, but there was logic to it. He gave priority to national interests and ample consideration to realpolitik.

Here is how Sasakawa described his state of mind after the war:

> As Yamamoto Isoroku's foresaw, we would not be able to sustain our national strength if the war lasted more than eighteen months. Japan surrendered, overwhelmed by American might, after spilling the last drop of its blood. It was an inevitable outcome. In such circumstances, the warrior of the past met his death honorably. He accepted his fate, without cursing others or harboring bitterness against them, but simply blaming his own lack of skill and inexperience. That was my feeling toward America. In war each side fights with all its might and the weaker loses. This is logical. It is not reasonable to hold a grudge against the victor. Having fought fairly on the battlefield it is no time to be dishonorable afterwards. That is the wisdom coming from both Japanese Bushido [the warrior's chivalrous sense of honor] and the American sense of fair play. I felt no bitterness or grudge against America, but I had a mountain of things to say against a certain other country.

(The "other country" mentioned here was the Soviet Union. At the time he was preparing his book *Expressions of Sugamo* for publication, he wished to make this reference ambiguous since Japan was still under Allied Occupation, including the Soviet Union, and to criticize one of the Allies could jeopardize publication.) He considered that his final contribution to his country was to spill out his feelings regarding the Soviet Union at the trial.[176]

In all of this, a point to recognize or to restate is the consistency of Sasakawa's thinking before, during, and after the war. We have seen how his prewar notion of "Hakko Ichi'u" (Eight Corners of the World under One Roof) had developed into the concept of the world as "one family" in the post war years and how his prewar populism evolved into post-war democracy.

This is not to say that the defeat and the ensuing years in Sugamo Prison had little or no effect on him.

> My three years in prison gave me the time and the opportunity to reflect on myself.... Throughout my detention, and the ensuing years until all the war convicts were finally released, my mother made daily visits to the shrine to pray for us in spite of the poor state of her health. It was her devotion that changed my whole life and way of thinking, I would have to say, and enabled me to face the postwar years. I vowed then to devote myself the rest of my life to the construction of a new Japan and to the less fortunate among us.
>
> There was a time in my life when I was ambitious and wanted fame, and to boost the family name. And then there were times when I wanted to give myself to a just cause. I went through ups and downs in fortune and had to grapple with contradictions in my own life. After the war, I learned all about human beings in Sugamo and I don't know whether to call it enlightenment, but I lost all selfish desires.[177]

As to the war and the defeat:

> The years in Sugamo made me realize the utter stupidity of the war crimes tribunal. Without the experience of Sugamo and the crushing defeat of Japan I might have continued to tout militarism and be a warmonger, while enjoying the spectacle of the weak going to the wall. If, as a consequence of Japan's defeat, Asian peoples were truly liberated and able to enjoy independence, the result is good and our sacrifice may not have been in vain.[178]

Sasakawa was not one of those who made a volte-face after the war or jumped on the bandwagon. However, he had "died" once — with the defeat of Japan. There is no doubt that the defeat was the most staggering reverse of his life. But true to his character he fought hard to come back. He had found a purpose in life when he declared while he was still in Sugamo: "I have the power to move others because I act not as

Sasakawa Ryoichi but as a messenger of the uncountable victims of war, with a mission to free all people from its misery forever."[179]

Sasakawa, on his own account, had "died" along with the Empire of Japan and was then reborn as a larger man, thanks to his mother's self-sacrifice and "the myriad spirits of the war victims." In the next chapter we discover how he had a business inspiration while in prison in Sugamo. Its success enabled Sasakawa to build what became the world's largest private grant-giving foundation. The spiritual basis of the philanthropy for which he was destined to be widely known was nurtured during the Sugamo days.

Notes

1. See Chapter 2, p. 136, Table 1.
2. Sasakawa Ryoichi, *Sugamo Nikki* [Sugamo diary] (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1997), 124.
3. Nosaka Sanzo was a leader of the Japan Communist Party who returned to Japan from China after the war ended. He had engaged in anti-Japanese propaganda during the war, basing himself at Yenan, the operational center for the Chinese communist leadership under Mao Zedong.
4. Ishikawa Tatsuzo (1905-85) was a novelist and winner of the Akutagawa Prize. He was known for his work on the 1937 "Rape of Nanking," as an instance of large-scale arson, plunder, and murder of civilians and surrendered Chinese soldiers by Japanese forces.
5. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 143. *Konnyaku* is a jelly-like food made from taro.
6. Ibid., 276.
7. Ibid., 37.
8. Ibid., 405.
9. Ibid., 288.
10. Ibid., 311-12.
11. Ibid., 66.
12. Honma Masaharu, commander of the Japanese 14th Army, directed operations in the Philippines from 1941 onward and was sentenced to death after the war by a tribunal held in Manila as the commander responsible for the "Bataan Death March."
13. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 101. Yamashita Takebumi was a supreme Japanese commander in the Philippines.
14. Sasakawa Ryoichi, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo* [Expressions of Sugamo, as seen by Sasakawa Ryoichi: Secret records of a "war criminal suspect"] (Osaka: Bunkajinshobo, 1947), 89.
15. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 329.
16. Sasakawa Ryoichi, *Sasakawa Ryoichi Kankei Bunsho* [Sasakawa papers], unpublished documents kept at the Nippon Foundation, dated 18 May 1946.

17. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 32-33.

18. Sasakawa Ryoichi, unpublished documents, submitted to International Prosecution Section (IPS), nos. 6, 9, and 10, date unknown.

19. Yamaoka Sohachi, *Hatenko Ningen Sasakawa Ryoichi* [Sasakawa Ryoichi: Record-breaking man] (Tokyo: Yuhosha, 1978), 231-32.

20. Awaya Kentaro and Yoshida Yutaka, eds., Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku (IPS) Jinmon Chosho* [Official records of interrogations by examining prosecutors] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1993), 221.

21. Ibid., 126, quoting Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) records, *Minkan Joho Kyoku,* 4 December 1945.

22. Ibid., 201, quoting US Army General Staff Section 11, G-2 "Top Secret" document, 4 July 1947.

23. Paula Daventry, ed., *Sasakawa: The Warrior for Peace the Global Philanthropist,* 2d ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), 56.

24. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 39-44.

25. Yamaoka, *Hatenko Ningen Sasakawa Ryoichi,* 236-37.

26. See Counter Intelligence Corps, 90th Army Post Office 660, unpublished document no. 4, declassified by Occupation Authority on 26 November 1990 (10 December 1945).

27. Ibid. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 143.

28. Awaya and Yoshida, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 143-44. Royama Masamichi was the influential editor-in-chief of *Chuo Koron*, a liberal magazine founded in 1899 that reached a peak during the Taisho Era when democracy flourished. Publication halted in 1944 as paper was in short supply and resumed in 1946.

29. Kokushidaijiten Henshu Iinkai [The Editorial Committee of the Encyclopedia of National History], ed., Vol. 2, *Kokushi Daijiten* [Encyclopedia of national history] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1980).

30. Abe Shinnosuke, ed., *Gendai Nihon Jinbutsuron* [Contemporary Japanese personality portraits] (Tokyo: Kawadeshobo, 1952), 260.

31. Kodama Yoshio, Vol. 2, *Fu-un: Kodama Yoshio Chosaku Senshu* [Winds and clouds: The collected works of Kodama Yoshio], ed. Kurihara Kazuo (Tokyo: Nihon Oyobi Nihonjinsha, 1972), 176; and Vol. 3, *Fu-un,* 360. Kodama returned from China just before the end of the war with a planeload of commodities and gold — a fortune that he donated to Hatoyama Ichiro, a leading conservative politician. The latter used this treasure to fund the Liberal Democratic Party, the group that has ruled Japan continuously since 1945 either in its present form or in a coalition of the two political parties that created the LDP by joining forces in 1955.

32. See Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 229-30.

33. Sasakawa Ryoichi, "Fukkokuban Hakko ni Yosete" [Introduction to the reprinted edition], in Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo.*

34. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 113.

35. Ibid., 154.

36. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 202.

37. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 129-30.
38. Ibid., 138.
39. Ibid., 139.
40. Ibid., 141.
41. Ibid., 296-97.
42. Ibid., 312.
43. Ibid., 439-40.
44. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 143-45.
45. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 120.
46. Document no. 10, dated 8 January 1946. The English text is contained in IPS official records of interrogations by examining prosecutors. See Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 154.
47. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 409-10.
48. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 146-47. The *moso* bamboo alluded to in the poem is the strongest, broadest-stemmed species of bamboo, found in southern parts of Japan.
49. Sasakawa Ryoichi, *Jinrui Mina Kyodai* [Human Beings Are All Brothers and Sisters] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985), 35-36.
50. Kishi Nobusuke et al., *Kishi Nobusuke no Kaiso* [Memoirs of Kishi Nobusuke] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1981), 303-4.
51. Kodama, *Fu-un,* 273-74.
52. Sasakawa Shizue, interviewed by Sato Seizaburo, 14 August 1997.
53. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 31.
54. Ibid., 41.
55. Document no 10, dated 8 January 1946. This Sasakawa statement partially translated into English and contained in Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* IPS, 154-65.
56. Ibid.
57. Samuel Healey, "Fairu Dai 185" [File no. 185]. Unpublished memorandum, dated 13 April 1946.
58. Shioda Michio, *Tenno to Tojo Hideki no Kuno* [Anguish of the emperor and Tojo Hideki] (Tokyo: Nihon Bungeisha, 1988), 189-90.
59. Awaya, numbered 25 in a series of portraits. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 41.
60. Sasakawa Ryoichi, "Kokumin no Giwaku wo Isso no Gen'an" [Proposed ways to dispel the misgivings of the people]. Unpublished document, submitted to Occupation authorities, document no. 10.
61. Pacific US Army GHQ Intelligence Section. Samuel Healey, "Fairu Dai 19" [File no. 19]. Unpublished document, dated 8 January 1946.
62. Document no. 10, 8 July 1946.
63. "Sasakawa Ryoichi Jinmon Chosho" [Records of Sasakawa Ryoichi's interrogation]. Unpublished document, dated 18 January 1946.
64. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 25, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 1993, 431. Kodama had himself not been indicted up to this point, a year and a half after his incarceration. Like Sasakawa he was never to be indicted.
65. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 190-94.

66. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 312.
67. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 391-93.]
68. The International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Forces, unpublished documents, dated 4 August 1947.
69. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 25, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 428-31.
70. "Kodama Yoshio Jinmon Chosho" [Records of Kodama Yoshio's interrogation]. Unpublished document, 20 June 1947.
71. Healey, "Fairu Dai 185," 21 July 1947.
72. Yamaoka, *Hatenko Ningen Sasakawa Ryoichi,* 219-21.
73. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 25, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 427.
74. "Sasakawa Ryoichi Jinmon Chosho" [Records of Sasakawa Ryoichi's interrogation], unpublished document, dated 10 April 1946. The English translation of this part of the record is contained in Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 293.
75. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 232.
76. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 277-78.
77. Ibid., 279.
78. Ibid., 311-15.
79. Ibid., 284-86.
80. Ibid., 174.
81. Ibid., xx.
82. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 176-77.
83. Ibid., 57.
84. Ishihara Hiroichiro, Akazawa Shiro, and Awaya Kentaro, eds., *Ishihara Hiroichiro Kankei Bunsho* [Ishihara Hiroichiro and related papers] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1994), 263.
85. Ibid., 338.
86. Ibid., 375.
87. Ibid., 335.
88. Kodama, Vol. 1, *Fu-un,* 401.
89. Kodama, Vol. 2, *Fu-un,* 363-64.
90. Takahashi Shin'ichi, ed., *Waga Kaigun to Takahashi Sankichi* [The Navy and Takahashi Sankichi] (Publication site unknown: Takahashi Shin'ichi, 1970), 106.
91. Ibid. 114-15.
92. 9 January 1946. See Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 66.
93. 15 January 1946. Ibid., 74.
94. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 106-8.
95. Ibid., 71.
96. Ibid.
97. Sasakawa, Sugamo Nikki, 79.
98. Ibid.
99. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 116.
100. Ibid., 72.
101. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 103.
102. Kodama, Vol. 2, *Fu-un,* 261.

103. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 213.
104. Ibid., 120.
105. Ibid., 125-26.
106. Ibid., 128.
107. Ibid., 103.
108. Ibid., 44-5.
109. Ibid., 152.
110. Ibid., 40.
111. Ibid., 377-78.
112. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 117.
113. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 247-48.
114. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 59-61.
115. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 265.
116. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo,* 116-17.
117. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 191.
118. Ibid., 212.
119. Ibid., 216. As to the name of the officer, he is identified in *Ishihara Hiroichiro Kankei Bunsho,* Vol. 1, p. 400, as First Lieutenant Kurisaki; Kodama Yoshio refers to "Kurisaki" in his memoir "Wind and Clouds," Vol. 2, p. 284. Kurisaki is probably correct.
120. Ishihara et al., *Ishihara Hiroichiro Kankei Bunsho,* 400.
121. Ibid.
122. Sasakawa, Sugamo Nikki, 216.
123. Ibid., 215-16.
124. Ibid., 216-27. Sasakawa's references to the maltreatment are on pp. 218, 219, 220, 221, 222-23, 227. and 220.
125. Ishihara et al., *Ishihara Hiroichiro Kankei Bunsho,* 400.
126. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 223.
127. Ibid., 230.
128. Ibid., 360.
129. Ishihara et al., *Ishihara Hiroichiro Kankei Bunsho,* 400.
130. Kodama, Vol. 2, *Fu-un,* 284.
131. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 298.
132. Ibid., 38-39.
133. Ibid., 291.
134. Awaya and Yoshida, Vol. 24, *Kokusai Kensatsukyoku,* 143.
135. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* references to the weather and the 1946 rice crop are found on pp. 142, 146, 149, 179, 182, 194 and 202.
136. Ibid., 84.
137. Ibid., 250.
138. Ibid., 259.
139. Ibid., 268-69.
140. Ibid., 290-91.
141. Tsurumaki Yasuo, *Kaikaku no Jidai* [An era of reform] (Tokyo: IN Press, 1989), 19.
142. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki,* 68.

143. Ibid., 100.

144. Ibid., 146.

145. Ibid., 147.

146. Ibid., 201, entry on 7 September 1946.

147. Shibuichi Mitsuo, interviewed by Sato Seizaburo, 5 February 1998.

148. Yamaura Kan'ichi, "Senpan Shakuho" [Releasing war criminals], *Tokyo Shimbun,* 21 June 1952.

149. Numajiri Shigeru, letter to Sasakawa Ryoichi, 3 August 1949, addressing Sasakawa as principal of Sugamo School.

150. Taniguchi Gosuke, letter to Sasakawa Ryoichi, 3 October 1948.

151. Hayashi Yoshinori, letter to Sasakawa Ryoichi, 10 October 1949.

152. Tokyo Saiban Handobukku Henshu Iinkai [Tokyo Trial Handbook Editorial Committee] ed., *Tokyo Saiban Handobukku* [Tokyo Trial handbook] (Tokyo: Aokishoten, 1989), Table 1, 219.

153. Ibid., 140.

154. The given name of the Mr. Machino referred to was Takema. A former officer in the Japanese Army, he served overseas as an adviser to Zhang Zuolin (1873-1928), a Chinese warlord killed in 1928 when his train was blown up by the Japanese Kwantung Army. He was a notable figure who had served as an adviser to Prince Konoe (1891-1945), politician, prince, and prime minister.

155. Hoshino Naoki, letter addressed to Sasakawa Ryoichi. 29 May 1952. There was no longer any trace, in their relationship, of the confrontation that took place between Sasakawa and Hoshino, when the latter was serving as chief cabinet secretary under General Tojo Hideki.

156. Ochiai Jinkuro, letter to Sasakawa Shizue, 29 May 1952.

157. Numajiri Shigeru, letter to Sasakawa Ryoichi, 30 May 1952.

158. Saigo Takamaori (1827-77), a Satsuma clansman and politician of the waning days of the Edo Period and the early Meiji Period, who worked to bring about a bloodless "Meiji Restoration." He was killed by government forces in a showdown in Kagoshima.

159. Segawa Masumi, letter to Sasakawa Ryoichi and Sasakawa Shizue, 3 June 1952.

160. These are names of towns.

161. Kawaguchi Kiyotake, letter to Sasakawa Ryoichi, 28 July 1952.

162. Sasakawa, *Kankei Bunsho.*

163. Ibid.

164. Yamaoka, *Hatenko Ningen Sasakawa Ryoichi,* 264.

165. Onishi Hajime, "Sugamo no Oya" [Parents of Sugamo], *Sakuraboshi* [Cherry Blossoms and Stars], 1 June 1956, 11.

166. Yamaoka, *Hatenko Ningen Sasakawa Ryoichi,* 265.

167. Zenkoku Motaboto Kyosokai Rengokai, ed., *Motaboto 30 Nenshi: Topikkusu hen* [History of thirty years of motorboat racing: Topics] (Zenkoku Motaboto Kyosokai, 1981), 38.

168. Zenkoku Motaboto Kyosokai Rengokai, ed., *'81-'90 Motaboto Kyoso Nenshi: Kyotei Gannen karano Ayumi* [History of motorboat racing, 1981-90] (Zenkoku Motaboto Kyosokai, 1991), 116-17.

169. Sasakawa Ryoichi, "Shin'ainaru Shokun" [My dear friends], 15 April 1946, in Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki*, 274-75.

170. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo*, 113-14.

171. Ibid., 153-54.

172. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki*, 198.

173. Ibid., 203.

174. Ibid., 207.

175. Sasakawa Ryoichi, *Kono Keisho wa Nariyamazu* [The alarm bell never stops] (Tokyo: Shirakawashoin, 1981), 44.

176. Sasakawa, *Sasakawa Ryoichi no Mita Sugamo no Hyojo*, 29-30.

177. Nihon Gin Ken Shibu Shinkokai, [The Japan Recitation, Dancing, and Fencing Association], *Sasakawa Ryoichi Kaicho to Zaidan 25 Nen no Eiko no Kiseki* [Chairman Sasakawa Ryoichi and twenty-five years of the glorious history of our association] (Tokyo: Nihon Gin Ken Shibu Shinkokai, 1993), 6.

178. Sasakawa, *Kono Keisho wa Nariyamazu*, 44.

179. Sasakawa, *Sugamo Nikki*, 119.